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Donor competition for aid impact, and aid fragmentation /
This paper shows that donors that maximize relative aid impact spread their budgets across many recipient countries in a unique Nash equilibrium, explaining aid fragmentation. This equilibrium may be inefficient even without fixed costs, and the inefficiency increases in the equality of donors'...
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
|---|---|
| Autores principales: | , |
| Autor Corporativo: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
[Washington, D.C.] :
International Monetary Fund,
©2012.
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| Colección: | IMF working paper ;
WP/12/204. |
| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |