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Donor competition for aid impact, and aid fragmentation /
This paper shows that donors that maximize relative aid impact spread their budgets across many recipient countries in a unique Nash equilibrium, explaining aid fragmentation. This equilibrium may be inefficient even without fixed costs, and the inefficiency increases in the equality of donors'...
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Autor Corporativo: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
[Washington, D.C.] :
International Monetary Fund,
©2012.
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| Colección: | IMF working paper ;
WP/12/204. |
| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
| Sumario: | This paper shows that donors that maximize relative aid impact spread their budgets across many recipient countries in a unique Nash equilibrium, explaining aid fragmentation. This equilibrium may be inefficient even without fixed costs, and the inefficiency increases in the equality of donors' budgets. The paper presents empirical evidence consistent with theoretical results. These imply that, short of ending donors' maximization of relative aid impact, agreements to better coordinate aid allocations are not implementable. Moreover, since policies to increase donor competition in terms of aid effectiveness risk reinforcing relativeness, they may well backfire, as any such reinforcement increases aid fragmentation. |
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| Notas: | Title from PDF title page (IMF Web site, viewed August 13, 2012). "Middle East and Central Asia Dept." "August 2012." |
| Descripción Física: | 1 online resource (37 pages) |
| Bibliografía: | Includes bibliographical references. |
| ISBN: | 1475559577 9781475559576 147550554X 9781475505542 147553924X 9781475539240 1475520212 9781475520217 |