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Being in time : dynamical models of phenomenal experience /
Given that a representational system's phenomenal experience must be intrinsic to it and must therefore arise from its own temporal dynamics, consciousness is best understood -- indeed, can only be understood -- as being in time. Despite that, it is still acceptable for theories of consciousnes...
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
|---|---|
| Otros Autores: | , , |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Amsterdam ; Philadelphia :
John Benjamins Pub. Co.,
2012.
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| Colección: | Advances in consciousness research ;
v. 88. |
| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Being in Time; Editorial page; Title page; LCC data; Table of contents; Introduction; Conclusion; Time after time; 1. Introduction: Ubiquitous time; 2. A middle way: Dynamical systems; 3. Brainspace; 4. Temporality now!; 5. Countdown to implementation; 6. Crossing the explanatory gap; Acknowledgements; References; Neuronal reflections and subjective awareness; 1. Introduction- the optimistic outlook; 2. The creative nature of visual perception; 3. A colossal library; 4. Building templates- hierarchically; 5. A combinatorial explosion; 6. The ambiguity inherent in isolated responses.
- 7. Neuronal reflections8. Experimental consequences; 9. What is so unique about the cerebral cortex?; 10. Is consciousness a local or global phenomenon?; 11. Is visual awareness dependent on higher levels of the cortical hierarchy?; References; From probabilities to percepts; 1. Introduction; 2. The ubiquity of sensory ambiguity and its absence from sensory consciousness; 3. An orthogonal order of estimates and the 'precedence of the gaze'; 4. Design features of a global best estimate buffer; 4.1 The neural numerology of sensory experience.
- 4.2 Our panoramic, nested, ego-centric, three-dimensional visual world4.3 "Just in time" for the next gaze movement: brief career of the global best estimate; 5. Cortex, colliculus and "the other thalamus"; 6. Conclusion; References; Being in time; 1. A few more constraints on theories of phenomenal experience; 1.1 Autonomy; 1.2 Timeliness; 1.3 Computational tractability; 2. Implications of the autonomy of experience; 3. Time is of the essence; 4. Waiting for Godot; 4.1 The attractor hypothesis; 4.2 The way ahead; 5. Computational tools for distributed dynamic coordination; 6. Summary.
- AcknowledgmentsReferences; The (lack of) mental life of some machines; 1. Introduction
- special laws:; 2. One bit at a time; 3. How detailed is detailed enough?; 4. Not all machines are born equal; 5. Conclusion; Acknowledgements; References; Restless minds, wandering brains; 1. Introduction; 1.1 Escaping robustness; 2. Perceptual switching; 3. An EEG-study of perceptual mind wandering; 4. The dynamics of mind-wandering; 5. What happens to the laminar intervals when observers do engage in a task?; 6. Conclusion; Acknowledgement; References; Fuzzy consciousness; 1. Introduction.
- 2. Cylinder sets3. The pushing and pulling of consciousness; 4. Discussion; References; Two dynamical themes in Husserl; 1. Background; 2. Horizon theory/constitution; 3. Transcendental-eidetic phenomenology; 4. Conclusion; References; Desiderata for a mereotopological theory of consciousness; 1. Introduction: Unity, holism, and temporal continuity; 2. Mereotopology as a new tool for the study of consciousness; 2. A critical application: Does an experience have temporal parts?; 3. "Self-embedding": Sketch of a positive proposal; 4. Conclusion; References; The brain and its states.