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The economics of collusion : cartels and bidding rings /
Explicit collusion is an agreement among competitors to suppress rivalry that relies on interfirm communication and/or transfers. Rivalry between competitors erodes profits; the suppression of rivalry through collusion is one avenue by which firms can enhance profits. Many cartels and bidding rings...
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
|---|---|
| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Cambridge, Mass. :
MIT Press,
©2012.
|
| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Contents
- Preface
- Chapter 1. Introduction
- 1.1 Motivating Example
- 1.2 Collusion within Portera's Five Forces
- 1.3 Difficulties of Collusion
- 1.4 Environments Requiring Explicit Collusion
- 1.5 Lingering Price Effects of Explicit Collusion
- 1.6 Price Formation Process
- 1.7 Economic Rationale for the Illegality of Explicit Collusion
- 1.8 Cartel Detection
- 1.9 Outline of the Book
- 1.10 Appendix: Factors Affecting the Sustainability of Tacit Collusion
- Part I. Collusion in Practice
- Chapter 2. Narrative of a Cartel
- 2.1 The Story Begins2.2 Initiation of the Cartel
- 2.3 Market Share Division
- 2.4 Price Increases and Announcements
- 2.5 Sales Force Issues
- 2.6 Redistributions
- 2.7 Questions and Answers
- Chapter 3. Narrative of a Bidding Ring
- 3.1 Preamble
- 3.2 The Instruction Begins
- 3.3 Two Motivations for the Ring
- 3.4 Ring Logistics
- 3.5 Ring Membership
- 3.6 Auctioneer's Response
- 3.7 Implementation of Sidepayments
- 3.8 Questions and Answers
- Chapter 4. Narrative of Cartel Detection
- 4.1 Preamble
- 4.2 The Seminar Begins4.3 Taxonomy of Cartel Actions4.4 Economic Evidence of Collusion
- 4.5 Questions and Answers
- Part II. Economics of Cartels
- Chapter 5. Suppression of Rivalry by Cartels
- 5.1 Basics
- 5.2 Buyer Resistance
- 5.3 Model of Price Competition without Buyer Resistance
- 5.4 Collusive Outcomes
- 5.5 Incentives for Cheating
- 5.6 Conclusion
- Chapter 6. Implementation of Collusion by Cartels
- 6.1 The Central Cartel Problem and the Solution
- 6.2 Pricing Structures
- 6.3 Allocation Structures
- 6.4 Enforcement Structures
- 6.5 Conclusion
- 6.6 Appendix: Third-Party Facilitation
- Chapter 7. Beyond the Suppression of Within-cartel Rivalry
- 7.1 Sharing Mutually Beneficial Investments
- 7.2 A Dominant Firm versus a Cartel Acting as a Dominant Firm
- 7.3 Direct Actions against Noncartel Firms
- 7.4 Perimeter Forces
- 7.5 Sixth Force of Government
- 7.6 Conclusion
- 7.7 Appendix: Antitrust Exemptions
- Part III. Economics of Bidding Rings
- Chapter 8. Suppression of Interbidder Rivalry by Rings
- 8.1 Role of Auctions and Procurements in Price Discovery
- 8.2 Suppression of Rivalry at an Auction
- 8.3 Ring Composition8.4 Effects of Auction Format and Ring Size
- 8.5 Conclusion
- 8.6 Appendix A: Numerical Example of Leakage at a Sealed-Bid Auction
- 8.7 Appendix B: Numerical Example of Membership and Participation at a Sealed-Bid Auction
- Chapter 9. Implementation of Collusion by Rings
- 9.1 Rings versus Cartels
- 9.2 Ring Secret Deviations
- 9.3 Ring Pricing Structures and Seller Resistance
- 9.4 Ring Allocation Structures
- 9.5 Ring Enforcement Structures
- 9.6 Ring Mechanisms for Standard Auction Types
- 9.7 Efficiency of Allocations