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Politicized Justice in Emerging Democracies : a Study of Courts in Russia and Ukraine.
This book proposes a strategic pressure theory that argues that in emerging democracies, political competition eggs on rather than restrains power-hungry politicians.
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Cambridge :
Cambridge University Press,
2012.
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| Colección: | Comparative constitutional law and policy.
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| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Cover; POLITICIZED JUSTICE IN EMERGING DEMOCRACIES; Title; Copyright; Contents; Figures; Tables; Acknowledgments; Introduction; WHY STUDY THE RULE OF LAW?; JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND THE RULE OF LAW; WHY DO SOME COUNTRIES HAVE INDEPENDENTCOURTS AND OTHERS DO NOT?; JUDICIAL (IN)DEPENDENCE IN RUSIA AND UKRAINE; ROADMAP; 1: What Is Judicial Independence?; INSTITUTIONAL JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE; BEHAVIORAL JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE; DECISIONAL JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE; INDEPENDENT FROM WHOM? JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCEFROM DIFERENT PRINCIPALS; CAPACITY VS. WILLINGNESS CONCEPTUALIZATIONOF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE.
- JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT DIFFERENTLEVELS OF ABSTRACTIONCONCLUSION; 2: Judges and Politicians: Theories about the Origins ofJudicial Independence; STRUCTURAL INSULATION THEORIES OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: HOW TO MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR POLITICIANS TO PRESSURE THE COURTS; STRATEGIC ACTOR THEORIES OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: WHEN DO POLITICIANS OFFER INDEPENDENT COURTS?; STRATEGIC ACTOR THEORIES OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: WHEN DO JUDGES RESIST PRESSURE FROM POLITICIANS?; JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND REGIME TYPE: WHY ARE INDEPENDENT COURTS A RARITY OUTSIDE OF THE WORLD'S CONSOLIDATED DEMOCRACIES?
- POLITICAL COMPETITION AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN EMERGING DEMOCRACIES
- A STRATEGIC PRESSURE THEORYREGIME AGE AND INDEPENDENT COURTS; CONCLUSION; 3: What Can a Focused Comparison of Russia and Ukraine Tell Us about the Origins of Independent Courts?; EXISTING MEASURES OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE; MULTISTAGE WIN-RATE ANALYSIS AS A METHOD OFMEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE; MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE FROMPOLITICIANS IN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE; WHY RUSSIA AND UKRAINE?; Similarities between Russia and Ukraine; Structural Insulation of the Judiciary in Russia and Ukraine.
- Political Competition in Russia and UkraineTHEORETICAL PREDICTIONS ABOUT JUDICIALINDEPENDENCE IN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE; 4: The Role of Ukrainian and Russian Courts in the Provision of Free and Fair Elections: JudicialIndependence from Politicians during the 2002 Radaand the 2003 Duma Campaign; WHAT ARE ELECTORAL REGISTRATION DISPUTES?; THE DATASETS; WHAT CAN A PLAINTIF'S POLITICAL AFILIATIONTELL US ABOUT JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE?; MEASURING THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES; ADMINISTRATIVE RESOURCES AND CASE MERIT: WHY 2002-2003 PROGOVERNMENT CANDIDATES SHOULD HAVE BEEN LOSING IN COURT.
- SARTORI SELECTION MODEL OF COURT APPEAL-RATE AND WIN-RATEEFFECT MAGNITUDE AS A MEASUREOF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE; IMPLICATIONS OF THE ELECTORAL DISPUTE ANALYSIS FOR JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE THEORIES; 5: The Role of Ukrainian and Russian Courts in the Provision of Press Freedom: Judicial Independence in Defamation Lawsuits, 1998-2003; THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK FOR DEFAMATION LAWSUITS; THE DATASETS; LOS, VICTORY, AND "MORAL DAMAGE" AWARDS: MULTISTAGE WIN-RATE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE FROM POLITICIANS IN DEFAMATION DISPUTES; JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE FROM OTHER PRINCIPALS; CONCLUSION.