Design of production contracts : lessons from theory and agriculture /

Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Bogetoft, Peter
Otros Autores: Olesen, Henrik Ballebye
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: [Copenhagen?] ; Herndon, VA : Copenhagen Business School Press, 2004.
Edición:1. ed.
Temas:
Contracts.
Agricultural contracts > Case studies.
Contracts
Contrats.
Contrats agricoles > Études de cas.
contracts.
Agricultural contracts
Case Reports
Case studies
Case studies.
Études de cas.
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Design of Production Contracts: Lessons from Theory and Agriculture
  • Content
  • Preface
  • Introduction
  • 1.1 The Theory of Contracting
  • 1.2 The Practice of Contracting
  • 1.3 Combining Theory and Practice
  • 1.4 The Research Project
  • 1.5 Readers Guide
  • 1.6 Homepage
  • 1.7 References
  • Ten Rules of Thumb in Contract Design
  • 2.1 Introduction
  • 2.2 Contract Design
  • 2.3 The Contracts
  • 2.4 Ten Rules of Thumb
  • 2.4.1 Coordinate production
  • Examples
  • 2.4.2 Balance the pros and cons of decentralization
  • Examples
  • 2.4.3 Minimize the costs of risk and uncertainty
  • Examples.
  • 2.4.4 Reduce the costs of post-contractual opportunism
  • Examples
  • 2.4.5 Reduce the costs of pre-contractual opportunism
  • Examples
  • 2.4.6 Do not kill cooperation
  • Examples
  • 2.4.7 Motivate long-term concerns
  • Examples
  • 2.4.8 Balance pros and cons of renegotiation
  • Examples
  • 2.4.9 Reduce the direct costs of contracting
  • Examples
  • 2.4.10 Use transparent contracts
  • Examples
  • 2.5 Conclusion
  • 2.6 References
  • Contract Theory: A Holistic Approach
  • 3.1 Introduction
  • 3.2 The Overall Goal
  • 3.3 Three Main Objectives
  • 3.4 Coordination
  • 3.4.1 Coordination of production.
  • 3.4.2 Coordination of risk
  • Risk sharing
  • Minimizing risk
  • 3.5 Motivation
  • 3.5.1 Participation
  • 3.5.2 Effort
  • The informativeness principle
  • Incentive intensity
  • Multi-tasking
  • Multiple producers
  • Robustness
  • 3.5.3 Investment
  • 3.6 Transaction Costs
  • 3.6.1 Entering a contract
  • 3.6.2 Conflict resolution
  • 3.6.3 Monitoring
  • 3.6.4 Influence costs
  • 3.7 Conclusion
  • 3.8 Appendix
  • 3.8.1 Incentive intensity
  • 3.8.2 Multiple tasks
  • 3.8.3 Yardstick competition
  • 3.9 References
  • Contract Production of Peas
  • 4.1 Introduction
  • 4.2 Background
  • 4.3 Chronology.
  • 4.4 The Contract
  • 4.5 Analysis of the Contract
  • 4.5.1 Coordination
  • 4.5.2 Risk sharing
  • Sources of risk
  • Risk borne by Danisco Foods
  • Risk shared among all farmers
  • Risk borne by the individual farmer
  • 4.5.3 Moral hazard
  • Opportunistic behavior from Danisco Foods
  • Opportunistic behavior from the farmers
  • 4.5.4 Hold-up
  • 4.5.5 Discrimination
  • 4.5.6 How should the groups be divided?
  • 4.5.7 Yardstick competition
  • 4.6 Conclusion
  • 4.7 Appendix
  • 4.7.1 The Current Contract
  • 4.7.2 Yardstick Competition
  • 4.8 References
  • Contract Production of Specialty pigs.
  • 5.1 Introduction
  • 5.2 Danish Crown
  • 5.3 Coordination
  • 5.4 Market-determined Bonus
  • 5.4.1 Sales
  • 5.4.2 Production
  • 5.4.3 Participation
  • 5.4.4 Risk sharing
  • 5.4.5 Influence costs
  • 5.5 Fixed Bonus
  • 5.5.1 Sales
  • 5.5.2 Production
  • 5.5.3 Participation
  • 5.5.4 Risk sharing
  • 5.5.5 Influence costs
  • 5.6 Fixed vs. Market-Determined Bonus
  • 5.7 Change of Bonus System
  • 5.8 Conclusion
  • 5.9 Appendix
  • 5.10 References
  • Fact Sheets
  • 6.1 Introduction
  • 6.2 Peas for Danisco Foods A/S
  • 6.2.1 The processor
  • Core business
  • Contracts
  • Size
  • Ownership.

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