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American Politicians Confront the Court : Opposition Politics and Changing Responses to Judicial Power.
Engel examines changing politicians' perceptions of the threat posed by opposition and how it influenced manipulations of judicial authority.
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Cambridge :
Cambridge University Press,
2011.
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| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Cover; American Politicians Confront the Court; Title; Copyright; Contents; Acknowledgments; Introduction Had Americans "Stopped Understanding about the Three Branches"?; I. Courts, Parties, and the Politics of Opposition; II. Moving Forward; PART I POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND ELECTED-BRANCH RELATIONS WITH THE JUDICIARY; 1 Beyond the Countermajoritarian Difficulty; I. The Countermajoritarian Difficulty and Four Responses; I.a. Dahl's Response: Countermajoritarianism Is Short-Lived; I.b. Strategic Interest: Politicians Want Strong Judiciaries.
- I.c. A Norm of Deference: An Account of Gradual Change over TimeII. Manipulating the Court: Undermining Judicial Legitimacy or Harnessing Judicial Power; III. Mapping Legislation: Patterns Over Time; IV. Conclusion; Appendix: Proposed Congressional Legislation Involving the Judiciary Disaggregated by Type; 2 A Developmental Theory of Politicians' Confrontations with Judicial Authority; I. The Presumption of Judicial Neutrality and Persistence of Anti-Judicial Hostilities; II. Opposition Legitimacy and Loyalty as Manifestations of Political Idiom.
- III. Multiple Constitutional Visions and the Rise of a Majoritarian CourtIV. Conclusion; PART II HOSTILITY TO JUDICIAL AUTHORITY AND THE POLITICAL IDIOM OF CIVIC REPUBLICANISM; 3 In Support of Unified Governance: Undermining the Court in an Anti-Party Age; I. Judges as Representatives of Popular Sovereignty; I.a. Accepting Judicial Review, Presuming Unity, and Fearing Consolidation; I.b. Judges' Early Steps to Secure Judicial Review; I.c. Judicial Review as Discovering the Act of Popular Sovereignty; II. An Age of Party Illegitimacy; II.a. Not Just Anti-Partisan, but Anti-Party.
- II.b. An Inherited Political Tradition Fearful of Open, Stable, and Permanent OppositionII.c. Sedition and the Kentucky Resolution: Hostility to Court-Centered Interpretation; II.d. 1800: A Peaceful Transition but No Acceptance of Opposition Legitimacy or Loyalty; III. The Jeffersonian Assault on the Judiciary; III.a. Framing the Reform of 1801: Civil Stability versus Party Threat; III.b. The Justices' Failed Strike Plan and Their Concession; IV. Impeaching Justice Samuel Chase and Neutrality as a Second-Best Solution; IV.a. Impeachment as Removal of Illegitimate Opposition.
- IV.b. Samuel Chase on Sedition and the Illegitimacy of OppositionIV.c. The Chase Impeachment: Toward Judicial Independence as Political Neutrality; V. Conclusion; 4 Party against Partisanship: Single-Party Constitutionalism and the Quest for Regime Unity; I. Unease with Opposition and Jacksonian Views of Judicial Authority; I.b. Van Buren's Democratic Party as Permanent Constitutional Majority; I.c. Van Buren's Party-based Justification of Jackson's Relations with the Judiciary; II. The Anti-Partyist Debate to Maintain Judicial Neutrality.