Free Will As An Open Scientific Problem.

An argument that the problem of free will boils down to an open scientific question about the causal histories of certain kinds of neural events.

Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: MIT Press 2009.
Temas:
Free will and determinism.
Ethics.
Libre arbitre et déterminisme.
Morale.
ethics (philosophy)
Ethics
Free will and determinism
Electronic resource.
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Introduction
  • Formulating the problem of free will
  • The old formulation of the problem of free will
  • Compatibilism and the rejection of an intermediate formulation of the problem of free will
  • The final (or a new-and-improved) formulation of the problem of free will
  • Some remarks on libertarianism
  • Synopsis of the book
  • Why the compatibilism issue and the conceptual-analysis issue are metaphysically irrelevant
  • What determines whether an answer to the what-is-free-will question is correct
  • Why the what-is-free-will question is irrelevant to the do-we-have-free-will
  • Question, assuming the OL view is correct
  • Why the what-is-free-will question is irrelevant to the do-we-have-free-will
  • Question, even if the OL view isn't correct
  • The which-kinds-of-freedom-do-we-have question
  • The coherence question
  • The moral responsibility question (and the issue of what's worth wanting)
  • Generalizing the argument
  • Why the compatibilism question reduces to the what-is-free-will question
  • Where we stand and where we're going next
  • An aside : some remarks on the what-is-free-will question, the compatibilism question, and the moral responsibility question
  • The what-is-free-will question and the compatibilism question
  • The moral responsibility question
  • Why the libertarian question reduces to the issue of indeterminacy
  • Preliminaries
  • Torn decisions
  • Indeterminacy
  • Appropriate non-randomness
  • The argument
  • If our torn decisions are undetermined, then we author and control them
  • The argument from token-token identity
  • The argument from phenomenology
  • Objections
  • Why TDW-indeterminism increases or procures authorship and control
  • Why this sort of L-freedom is worth wanting
  • If our torn decisions are undetermined, then they are sufficiently rational to be L-free
  • Plural authorship, control, and rationality non-torn decisions
  • Where we stand
  • Why there are no good arguments for or against determinism (or any other thesis that would establish or refute libertarianism)?
  • An a priori argument for determinism (and, hence, against TDW-indeterminism)
  • An a priori argument for libertarianism (and, hence, in favor of TDW-ndeterminism)
  • Empirical arguments
  • Arguments for universal determinism
  • Arguments for macro-level determinism or virtual macro-level determinism
  • Arguments for neural determinism or virtual neural determinism
  • Arguments for torn-decision determinism, or for virtual torn-decision
  • Determinism or against TDW-indeterminism
  • The argument from Tegmark's work
  • The argument from Libet's work
  • Arguments from psychology
  • Where we stand.

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