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|a UAMI
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|a Reisner, Andrew.
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|a Reasons for Belief.
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|a Leiden :
|b Cambridge University Press,
|c 2011.
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|a 1 online resource (285 pages)
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|a text
|b txt
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|a Cover; Half-title; Title; Copyright; Contents; Contributors; Preface; Introduction; Part I: Normative reasons for belief; Part II: Reasons and epistemic justification; Part i Normative reasons for belief; Chapter 1 How to be a teleologist about epistemic reasons; 1.1 Introduction; 1.2 definitions; 1.3 Epistemic reasons and value; 1.4 Two kinds of reasons for belief; 1.5 A teleological explanation of the relationship; 1.6 Objections; 1.7 Conclusion; Chapter 2 Is there reason to be theoretically rational?; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 The structure of normative requirements.
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|a 2.3 Why rational requirements are not normative requirements2.4 Three objections; 2.5 The normativity of theoretical rationality; 2.6 The relationship between normativity and theoretical rationality; 2.7 Lessons for practical rationality?; 2.8 Conclusion; Chapter 3 Epistemic motivation Towards a metaethics of belief; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 Three debates in metaethics transposed to epistemology; 3.3 Internalism about epistemic judgements: preliminaries; 3.4 Internalism about epistemic judgements: premise; 3.5 Internalism about epistemic judgements: premise; 3.6 Epistemic anti-humeanism.
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|a 3.7 Two challenges3.8 From epistemic motivation to the nature of epistemic judgements; 3.9 Conclusion; Chapter 4 Error theory and reasons for belief; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 Moral and epistemic reasons; transcendent and immanent norms; 4.3 Epistemic error theory: how undesirable?; 4.4 Epistemic error theory and the normativity of belief; 4.5 Summary; Chapter 5 Can reasons for belief be debunked?; 5.1 The classic debate: evidentialism vs. pragmatism; 5.2 A more radical opponent: the error theorist; 5.3 Defeating the error theorist; 5.4 A transcendental argument?
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|a Part II Reasons and epistemic justificationChapter 6 Reasons and belief's justification; 6.1 Introduction; 6.2 Reasons and demands; 6.3 Justification; Chapter 7 Perception, generality, and reasons; 7.1 Problems for the content view; 7.2 A problem for the object view; 7.3 Can states without content rationalize beliefs?; 7.4 A content view not modeled on belief; Chapter 8 Immediate warrant, epistemic responsibility, and Moorean dogmatism; 8.1 Immediate warrant and the demands of epistemic responsibility; 8.2 "Moorean dogmatism."
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|a 8.3 Appendix: responsibilist requirements and "transmission failure"Chapter 9 Primitively rational belief-forming processes; 9.1 How can there be fallible primitively rational processes?; 9.2 Assumptions about rationality; 9.3 A connection to the truth; 9.4 A priori processes; 9.5 A solution to the problem; Chapter 10 What does it take to "have" a reason?; 10.1 Clarifications: having evidence; 10.2 The setup: two arguments for a high bar, and two readings of the truism; 10.3 The alternative explanation: lack of justification guarantees defeat.
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|a Addresses foundational questions about reasons for belief and uses new research to explore traditional epistemological concerns.
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|a Print version record.
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|a Includes bibliographical references and index.
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|a ProQuest Ebook Central
|b Ebook Central Academic Complete
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650 |
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|a Belief and doubt.
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650 |
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6 |
|a Croyance et doute.
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650 |
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|a Belief and doubt
|2 fast
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700 |
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|a Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn.
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|i has work:
|a Reasons for Belief (Text)
|1 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCXCmqc6DkD9qKQmdPxYkjC
|4 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/ontology/hasWork
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776 |
0 |
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|i Print version:
|a Reisner, Andrew.
|t Reasons for Belief.
|d Leiden : Cambridge University Press, ©2011
|z 9781107006874
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856 |
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|u https://ebookcentral.uam.elogim.com/lib/uam-ebooks/detail.action?docID=674636
|z Texto completo
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938 |
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|a EBL - Ebook Library
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|a ProQuest MyiLibrary Digital eBook Collection
|b IDEB
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