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Reasons for Belief.

Addresses foundational questions about reasons for belief and uses new research to explore traditional epistemological concerns.

Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Reisner, Andrew
Otros Autores: Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Leiden : Cambridge University Press, 2011.
Temas:
Acceso en línea:Texto completo

MARC

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100 1 |a Reisner, Andrew. 
245 1 0 |a Reasons for Belief. 
260 |a Leiden :  |b Cambridge University Press,  |c 2011. 
300 |a 1 online resource (285 pages) 
336 |a text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a computer  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
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505 0 |a Cover; Half-title; Title; Copyright; Contents; Contributors; Preface; Introduction; Part I: Normative reasons for belief; Part II: Reasons and epistemic justification; Part i Normative reasons for belief; Chapter 1 How to be a teleologist about epistemic reasons; 1.1 Introduction; 1.2 definitions; 1.3 Epistemic reasons and value; 1.4 Two kinds of reasons for belief; 1.5 A teleological explanation of the relationship; 1.6 Objections; 1.7 Conclusion; Chapter 2 Is there reason to be theoretically rational?; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 The structure of normative requirements. 
505 8 |a 2.3 Why rational requirements are not normative requirements2.4 Three objections; 2.5 The normativity of theoretical rationality; 2.6 The relationship between normativity and theoretical rationality; 2.7 Lessons for practical rationality?; 2.8 Conclusion; Chapter 3 Epistemic motivation Towards a metaethics of belief; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 Three debates in metaethics transposed to epistemology; 3.3 Internalism about epistemic judgements: preliminaries; 3.4 Internalism about epistemic judgements: premise; 3.5 Internalism about epistemic judgements: premise; 3.6 Epistemic anti-humeanism. 
505 8 |a 3.7 Two challenges3.8 From epistemic motivation to the nature of epistemic judgements; 3.9 Conclusion; Chapter 4 Error theory and reasons for belief; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 Moral and epistemic reasons; transcendent and immanent norms; 4.3 Epistemic error theory: how undesirable?; 4.4 Epistemic error theory and the normativity of belief; 4.5 Summary; Chapter 5 Can reasons for belief be debunked?; 5.1 The classic debate: evidentialism vs. pragmatism; 5.2 A more radical opponent: the error theorist; 5.3 Defeating the error theorist; 5.4 A transcendental argument? 
505 8 |a Part II Reasons and epistemic justificationChapter 6 Reasons and belief's justification; 6.1 Introduction; 6.2 Reasons and demands; 6.3 Justification; Chapter 7 Perception, generality, and reasons; 7.1 Problems for the content view; 7.2 A problem for the object view; 7.3 Can states without content rationalize beliefs?; 7.4 A content view not modeled on belief; Chapter 8 Immediate warrant, epistemic responsibility, and Moorean dogmatism; 8.1 Immediate warrant and the demands of epistemic responsibility; 8.2 "Moorean dogmatism." 
505 8 |a 8.3 Appendix: responsibilist requirements and "transmission failure"Chapter 9 Primitively rational belief-forming processes; 9.1 How can there be fallible primitively rational processes?; 9.2 Assumptions about rationality; 9.3 A connection to the truth; 9.4 A priori processes; 9.5 A solution to the problem; Chapter 10 What does it take to "have" a reason?; 10.1 Clarifications: having evidence; 10.2 The setup: two arguments for a high bar, and two readings of the truism; 10.3 The alternative explanation: lack of justification guarantees defeat. 
520 |a Addresses foundational questions about reasons for belief and uses new research to explore traditional epistemological concerns. 
588 0 |a Print version record. 
504 |a Includes bibliographical references and index. 
590 |a ProQuest Ebook Central  |b Ebook Central Academic Complete 
650 0 |a Belief and doubt. 
650 6 |a Croyance et doute. 
650 7 |a Belief and doubt  |2 fast 
700 1 |a Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn. 
758 |i has work:  |a Reasons for Belief (Text)  |1 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCXCmqc6DkD9qKQmdPxYkjC  |4 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/ontology/hasWork 
776 0 8 |i Print version:  |a Reisner, Andrew.  |t Reasons for Belief.  |d Leiden : Cambridge University Press, ©2011  |z 9781107006874 
856 4 0 |u https://ebookcentral.uam.elogim.com/lib/uam-ebooks/detail.action?docID=674636  |z Texto completo 
938 |a EBL - Ebook Library  |b EBLB  |n EBL674636 
938 |a ProQuest MyiLibrary Digital eBook Collection  |b IDEB  |n 312719 
994 |a 92  |b IZTAP