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|a UAMI
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|a Information and Legislative Organization.
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260 |
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|b University of Michigan Press
|c 2010.
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|a 1 online resource (328)
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|a Cover13; -- Contents -- 113;. Introduction -- 2. Distributive Theories of Legislative Organization -- 3. Informational Theories of Legislative Organization -- 4. The Formation of Informative Committees -- 5. Information and the Choice of Rules -- 6. Chamber Control and Postftoor Procedures -- 7. Legislative Organization, Policy, and Performance -- Appendix A. Summary of Terms in Legislative Signaling Games -- Appendix 13;B. Additional Analysis of Committee Composition -- Appendix C. Probit Estimates and Calculations for Restrictive Rules -- Appendix D. Analysis of Conferee Selection -- Appendix 13;E. On Rules Changes: The Case of Conference Committees -- References -- Name Index -- Subject Index.
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|a In this controversial book, Keith Krehbiel investigates and casts doubt upon a view of Congress held by many academics, journalists, and members of the lay public: that Congress is organized primarily to facilitate logrolling or "gains from trade" between legislators. The author puts forward an alternative "informational" theory that, unlike previous formal theories, highlights institutional needs and individual incentives for acquiring policy expertise. Using games with incomplete information, Krehbiel derives a set of unique and testable predictions about the organization of legislatures -- including the composition of committees and the procedures under which legislation is considered. Krehbiel's creative illustrations and nonmathematical presentation of formal theories make this book accessible to a diverse set of readers. The political relevance and testability of games with incomplete information will be appreciated by game theorists and economists, while the book's findings make it essential reading for political scientists who study American politics, political institutions, or democratic legislatures.
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590 |
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|a ProQuest Ebook Central
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|a United States.
|b Congress.
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|a United States.
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650 |
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|a Policy sciences.
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650 |
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0 |
|a Uncertainty.
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650 |
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6 |
|a Sciences de la politique.
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650 |
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|a Incertitude.
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650 |
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|a Policy sciences
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650 |
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655 |
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4 |
|a Electronic resource.
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|a Krehbiel, Keith.
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