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Philosophy of the Brain. The brain problem.
"What is the mind?""What is the relationship between brain and mind?"These are common questions. But "What is the brain?" is a rare question in both the neurosciences and philosophy. The reason for this may lie in the brain itself: Is there a "brain problem"?I...
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
|---|---|
| Otros Autores: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
John Benjamins Publishing Company
2004.
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| Colección: | Advances in consciousness research ;
v. 52. |
| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Cover
- Editorial page
- Title page
- LCC page
- Dedication page
- Table of contents
- Acknowledgements
- The 'Brain problem'
- 1.1. The 'Brain problem'
- 1.1.1. 'Mind problems' in the 'philosophy of mind'
- 1.1.2. 'Brain Problem' in the 'philosophy of the brain'
- 1.2. Definition of the brain and 'dilemma of the brain'
- 1.2.1. The definition of the brain
- 1.2.2. The 'dilemma of the brain'
- 1.3. Hypothesis of 'embedment'
- 1.3.1. Defining 'embedment'
- 1.3.2. Defining 'neurophilosophical hypothesis'
- 1.3.3. Defining the brain
- 1.3.4. Strategy of investigation
- 1.4. Neurophilosophy as a method for investigation of the brain
- 1.4.1. Defining 'Neurophilosophy'
- 1.4.2. Principles of transdisciplinary methodology
- 1.4.3. 'Ontology' and 'epistemology' in neurophilosophy
- 1.4.4. 'Neurophilosophical hypothesis'
- 1.4.5. 'Standard arguments' against neurophilosophy
- Neuroepistemological account of the brain
- 2.1. 'Spatial embedment': The body and the own body
- 2.1.1. 'Bodily embedment': 'Phenomenal space'
- 2.1.2. 'Individual embedment': 'Intra-subjective character' of 'phenomenal space'
- Neuroepistemological implications: Body as spatial centre and 'intra-subjective character' of 'phenomenal space'
- 2.1.3. 'Emotional embedment': 'Phenomenal-qualitative character' of 'phenomenal space'
- Neuroepistemological implications: Emotions and the 'phenomenal-qualitative character' of 'phenomenal space'
- Spatio-emotional linkage and 'phenomenal-qualitative character' of 'phenomenal space'
- 2.2. 'Temporal embedment': The own body and other bodies
- 2.2.1. 'Environmental embedment': 'Phenomenal time'
- Neuroepistemological implications: Sensorimotor integration and 'phenomenal time'
- The relationship between 'phenomenal time' and 'physical time'
- 2.2.2. 'Intra-subjective embedment': 'Phenomenal judgment'
- Neuroepistemological implications: 'Agency/action judgments' and 'phenomenal judgments'
- 2.2.3. 'Inter-subjective embedment': 'Physical judgment'
- Neuroepistemological implications: Observation of action and 'physical judgments'
- 2.3. 'Mental embedment': The brain and the own body
- 2.3.1. 'Goal-oriented embedment': 'Autoepistemic limitation' and mental states
- Neuroepistemological implications: 'Embedded coding' and mental states
- 2.3.2. 'State-oriented embedment': Feelings and qualia
- Neuroepistemological implications: Emotions and qualia
- 2.3.3. 'Act-oriented embedment': Intentionality and mental causation
- Neuroepistemological implications: Intentionality and qualia
- 2.4. 'Reflexive embedment': The own brain and other brains
- 2.4.1. 'Neural embedment': First-Person Perspective
- Neuroepistemological implications: Imagery and First-Person Perspective
- 2.4.2. 'Personal embedment': Second-Person Perspective
- Neuroepistemological implications: Autobiographical memory and Second-Person Perspective
- 2.4.3. 'Social embedment': Third-Person Perspective
- Neuroepistemological implications: Social cognition and Third-Person Perspective
- 'Philosophy of the brain'
- 3.1. Empirical hypothesis of the brain: 'Dynamic brain', 'event coding', and 'embedded brain'
- 3.1.1. The dynamic organisation of the brain
- 3.1.2. The 'dynamic brain': 'Dynamic states' and 'First-Brain Perspective'
- 3.1.3. The 'brain code': 'Event coding' and the 'empirical mind problem'
- 3.1.4. The 'embedded brain': 'Mental presentation' and 'context-dependence'
- 'Mental presentation' as 'embedded rep.