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Can budget institutions counteract political indiscipline? /
The budget is an expression of political rather than economic priorities. We confirm this proposition for a group of new and potential members of the European Union, finding that politics dominates. The contemporary practice of democracy can increase budget deficits through not only ideological pref...
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Autor Corporativo: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
[Washington D.C.] :
International Monetary Fund, European Dept.,
2006.
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| Colección: | IMF working paper ;
WP/06/123. |
| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
| Sumario: | The budget is an expression of political rather than economic priorities. We confirm this proposition for a group of new and potential members of the European Union, finding that politics dominates. The contemporary practice of democracy can increase budget deficits through not only ideological preferences but also more fragmented government coalitions and higher voter participation. Long-term structural forces, triggered by societal divisions and representative electoral rules, have more ambiguous implications but also appear to increase budget pressures, as others have also found. However, our most robust, and hopeful, finding is that budget institutions-mechanisms and rules of the budget process-that create checks and balances have significant value even when the politics is representative but undisciplined, and when long-term structural forces are unfavorable. |
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| Descripción Física: | 1 online resource (51 pages) : illustrations |
| Bibliografía: | Includes bibliographical references. |
| ISBN: | 1282447939 9781282447936 9781451987256 1451987250 |