Cargando…
Goal-independent central banks : why politicians decide to delegate /
A motivation for central bank independence (CBI) is that policy delegation helps politicians manage diverse coalitions. This paper develops a model of coalition formation that predicts when delegation will occur. An analysis of policy preferences survey data and CBI indicators supports the predictio...
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
[Washington, D.C.] :
International Monetary Fund,
2006.
|
| Colección: | IMF working paper ;
WP/06/256. |
| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
| Sumario: | A motivation for central bank independence (CBI) is that policy delegation helps politicians manage diverse coalitions. This paper develops a model of coalition formation that predicts when delegation will occur. An analysis of policy preferences survey data and CBI indicators supports the predictions. Case studies, drawn from several countries' recent past and the nineteenth-century United States, provide further support. Finally, the model explains why the expected negative relationship between CBI and inflation is not empirically robust: endogenous selection biases the estimated effect towards zero. The data confirm this. |
|---|---|
| Descripción Física: | 1 online resource (41 pages) |
| Bibliografía: | Includes bibliographical references. |
| ISBN: | 1282649094 9781282649095 9781451909692 1451909691 1462362915 9781462362912 1452782423 9781452782423 9786613822901 6613822906 |
| ISSN: | 2227-8885 ; |