Cargando…

Outcomes-based conditionality : its role and optimal design /

The paper employs a principal-agent framework to analyze the role and design of outcomesbased conditionality in the presence of market frictions and domestic opposition. The results suggest that outcomes-based conditionality is a good option for the IMF when opposition to reforms is relatively weak...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Ivanova, Anna, 1968- (Autor)
Otros Autores: Marion, Nancy Peregrim
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, Research Dept., ©2006.
Colección:IMF working paper ; WP/06/128.
Temas:
Acceso en línea:Texto completo

MARC

LEADER 00000cam a2200000 a 4500
001 EBOOKCENTRAL_ocn694141224
003 OCoLC
005 20240329122006.0
006 m o d
007 cr cn|||||||||
008 060622s2006 dcu ob i000 0 eng d
040 |a E7B  |b eng  |e pn  |c E7B  |d OCLCQ  |d CBT  |d IDEBK  |d OCLCO  |d OCLCQ  |d OCLCF  |d OCLCE  |d OCLCQ  |d NLGGC  |d EBLCP  |d DEBSZ  |d OCLCQ  |d CUS  |d AZK  |d LOA  |d COCUF  |d MERUC  |d MOR  |d PIFAG  |d ZCU  |d OCLCQ  |d OCLCO  |d U3W  |d STF  |d WRM  |d CEF  |d ICG  |d CUS  |d NRAMU  |d VT2  |d AU@  |d OCLCQ  |d OCLCO  |d WYU  |d OCLCA  |d DKC  |d OCLCQ  |d HS0  |d ADU  |d OCLCQ  |d OCLCO  |d UKCRE  |d BOL  |d OCLCQ  |d OCLCO  |d OCLCQ  |d OCL  |d OCLCQ  |d OCLCO  |d OCLCL 
019 |a 647631309  |a 764537199  |a 805507939  |a 817800132  |a 961538549  |a 962606749  |a 966264005  |a 975207559  |a 975242065  |a 988494845  |a 991914723  |a 1017998000  |a 1037919473  |a 1038682259  |a 1041922077  |a 1044326775  |a 1045528302  |a 1058137969  |a 1060904048  |a 1065709316  |a 1074198744  |a 1080139795  |a 1112854929  |a 1114453215  |a 1119025952  |a 1153456877  |a 1202562108 
020 |a 1283513803 
020 |a 9781283513807 
020 |a 9781451984231 
020 |a 1451984235 
024 8 |a 10.5089/9781451984231.001 
029 1 |a AU@  |b 000053025361 
029 1 |a DEBBG  |b BV044086327 
029 1 |a DEBSZ  |b 449526550 
029 1 |a NZ1  |b 13864929 
035 |a (OCoLC)694141224  |z (OCoLC)647631309  |z (OCoLC)764537199  |z (OCoLC)805507939  |z (OCoLC)817800132  |z (OCoLC)961538549  |z (OCoLC)962606749  |z (OCoLC)966264005  |z (OCoLC)975207559  |z (OCoLC)975242065  |z (OCoLC)988494845  |z (OCoLC)991914723  |z (OCoLC)1017998000  |z (OCoLC)1037919473  |z (OCoLC)1038682259  |z (OCoLC)1041922077  |z (OCoLC)1044326775  |z (OCoLC)1045528302  |z (OCoLC)1058137969  |z (OCoLC)1060904048  |z (OCoLC)1065709316  |z (OCoLC)1074198744  |z (OCoLC)1080139795  |z (OCoLC)1112854929  |z (OCoLC)1114453215  |z (OCoLC)1119025952  |z (OCoLC)1153456877  |z (OCoLC)1202562108 
037 |b 00013468 
042 |a dlr 
050 4 |a HG3881  |b .I83 2006eb 
082 0 4 |a 330  |q OCoLC 
049 |a UAMI 
100 1 |a Ivanova, Anna,  |d 1968-  |e author.  |1 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCjJbrfkWvkXBQRDHDVvyMK 
245 1 0 |a Outcomes-based conditionality :  |b its role and optimal design /  |c prepared by Anna Ivanova. 
260 |a [Washington, D.C.] :  |b International Monetary Fund, Research Dept.,  |c ©2006. 
300 |a 1 online resource (23 pages) 
336 |a text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a computer  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a online resource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
340 |g polychrome.  |2 rdacc  |0 http://rdaregistry.info/termList/RDAColourContent/1003 
347 |a text file  |2 rdaft  |0 http://rdaregistry.info/termList/fileType/1002 
490 1 |a IMF working paper,  |x 2227-8885 ;  |v WP/06/128 
504 |a Includes bibliographical references. 
588 0 |a Print version record. 
520 |a The paper employs a principal-agent framework to analyze the role and design of outcomesbased conditionality in the presence of market frictions and domestic opposition. The results suggest that outcomes-based conditionality is a good option for the IMF when opposition to reforms is relatively weak and when the IMF loan is unsubsidized. The only role conditionality ends up playing in this case is that of an efficiency tool. The benefits of outcomes-based conditionality in the presence of strong opposition are less clear, and using this conditionality as an incentive tool would require that IMF financing be subsidized. 
506 |3 Use copy  |f Restrictions unspecified  |2 star  |5 MiAaHDL 
533 |a Electronic reproduction.  |b [Place of publication not identified] :  |c HathiTrust Digital Library,  |d 2010.  |5 MiAaHDL 
538 |a Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002.  |u http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212  |5 MiAaHDL 
583 1 |a digitized  |c 2010  |h HathiTrust Digital Library  |l committed to preserve  |2 pda  |5 MiAaHDL 
505 0 |a Contents -- I. INTRODUCTION -- II. THE MODEL -- III. OBSERVABLE CASE -- IV. UNOBSERVABLE CASE -- V. CONCLUSIONS -- REFERENCES 
590 |a ProQuest Ebook Central  |b Ebook Central Academic Complete 
610 2 6 |a Fonds monétaire international. 
650 0 |a Conditionality (International relations) 
650 0 |a International finance. 
650 0 |a Subsidies. 
650 0 |a Loans, Foreign. 
650 6 |a Conditionnalité (Relations internationales) 
650 6 |a Subventions. 
650 6 |a Prêts étrangers. 
650 7 |a subsidies.  |2 aat 
650 7 |a Subsidies  |2 fast 
650 7 |a Loans, Foreign  |2 fast 
650 7 |a Conditionality (International relations)  |2 fast 
650 7 |a International finance  |2 fast 
700 1 |a Marion, Nancy Peregrim. 
758 |i has work:  |a Outcomes-based conditionality (Text)  |1 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCGXJfRMjwrJMHWV4hHcfpX  |4 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/ontology/hasWork 
776 0 8 |i Print version:  |a Ivanova, Anna, 1968-  |t Outcomes-based conditionality.  |d [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, Fiscal Affairs Dept., 2006  |w (OCoLC)77530782 
830 0 |a IMF working paper ;  |v WP/06/128. 
856 4 0 |u https://ebookcentral.uam.elogim.com/lib/uam-ebooks/detail.action?docID=3014522  |z Texto completo 
936 |a BATCHLOAD 
938 |a EBL - Ebook Library  |b EBLB  |n EBL3014522 
938 |a ebrary  |b EBRY  |n ebr10380905 
938 |a ProQuest MyiLibrary Digital eBook Collection  |b IDEB  |n 382625 
994 |a 92  |b IZTAP