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Outcomes-based conditionality : its role and optimal design /
The paper employs a principal-agent framework to analyze the role and design of outcomesbased conditionality in the presence of market frictions and domestic opposition. The results suggest that outcomes-based conditionality is a good option for the IMF when opposition to reforms is relatively weak...
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Otros Autores: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
[Washington, D.C.] :
International Monetary Fund, Research Dept.,
©2006.
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| Colección: | IMF working paper ;
WP/06/128. |
| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
| Sumario: | The paper employs a principal-agent framework to analyze the role and design of outcomesbased conditionality in the presence of market frictions and domestic opposition. The results suggest that outcomes-based conditionality is a good option for the IMF when opposition to reforms is relatively weak and when the IMF loan is unsubsidized. The only role conditionality ends up playing in this case is that of an efficiency tool. The benefits of outcomes-based conditionality in the presence of strong opposition are less clear, and using this conditionality as an incentive tool would require that IMF financing be subsidized. |
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| Descripción Física: | 1 online resource (23 pages) |
| Bibliografía: | Includes bibliographical references. |
| ISBN: | 1283513803 9781283513807 9781451984231 1451984235 |
| ISSN: | 2227-8885 ; |