Are asset price guarantees useful for preventing sudden stops? : a quantitative investigation of the globalization hazard-moral hazard tradeoff /
An implication of the "globalization hazard" hypothesis is that sudden stops could be prevented by offering foreign investors price guarantees on emerging markets assets. These guarantees create a tradeoff, however, because they weaken globalization hazard by creating international moral h...
Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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Autores principales: | , |
Autor Corporativo: | |
Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
Idioma: | Inglés |
Publicado: |
[Washington, D.C.] :
International Monetary Fund, Research Dept.,
©2006.
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Colección: | IMF working paper ;
WP/06/73. |
Temas: | |
Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Contents
- I. INTRODUCTION
- II. A MODEL OF GLOBALIZATION HAZARD AND PRICE GUARANTEES
- III. CHARACTERIZING THE GLOBALIZATION HAZARD-MORAL HAZARD TRADEOFF
- IV. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
- V. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
- VI. CONCLUSIONS
- REFERENCES