Security of self-organizing networks : MANET, WSN, WMN, VANET /

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Reflecting recent advancements, Security of Self-Organizing Networks: MANET, WSN, WMN, VANET explores wireless network security from all angles. It begins with a review of fundamental security topics and often-used terms to set the foundation for the following chapters. Examining critical security i...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Otros Autores: Pathan, Al-Sakib Khan
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Boca Raton : Auerbach Pub., ©2011.
Temas:
Ad hoc networks (Computer networks) > Security measures.
Self-organizing systems > Security measures.
Réseaux ad hoc (Réseaux d'ordinateurs) > Sécurité > Mesures.
Systèmes auto-organisés > Sécurité > Mesures.
COMPUTERS > Internet > Security.
COMPUTERS > Networking > Security.
COMPUTERS > Security > General.
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Machine generated contents note: pt. I GENERAL TOPICS: SECURITY OF WIRELESS AND SELF-ORGANIZING NETWORKS
  • 1. Secure Device Association: Trends and Issues / Ian Wakeman
  • 1.1. Introduction
  • 1.2. Background
  • 1.2.1. Attack Types in Device Association Model
  • 1.2.1.1. Eavesdropping
  • 1.2.1.2. MiTM Attack
  • 1.2.1.3. DoS Attack
  • 1.2.1.4. Bidding-Down Attack
  • 1.2.1.5. Compromised Devices
  • 1.2.2. Device Association in Ad Hoc Environments
  • 1.2.2.1. Resurrecting Duckling Security Model
  • 1.2.2.2. Talking to Strangers
  • 1.2.2.3. Device Association Using Visual Out-of-Band Channels
  • 1.2.2.4. Device Association Using Audio Out-of-Band Channels
  • 1.2.2.5. Device Association Using Accelerometers
  • 1.2.2.6. Device Association Using Radio Signals
  • 1.2.2.7. Device Association Using Biometric Data
  • 1.2.2.8. Button-Enabled Device Association (BEDA)
  • 1.2.2.9. Bluetooth Pairing
  • 1.2.2.10. Device Association Using Near-Field Communication Technology
  • 1.2.2.11. Wireless Universal Serial Bus (WUSB) Association, WPS, and Windows Connect now-Net
  • 1.2.3. Comparative Analysis of Device Association Methods
  • 1.3. Future Directions for Research
  • 1.4. Conclusions
  • Acknowledgments
  • Terminologies
  • Questions and Sample Answers
  • Author's Biography
  • References
  • 2. Securing Route and Path Integrity in Multihop Wireless Networks / Vallipuram Muthukkumarasamy
  • 2.1. Introduction
  • 2.1.1. IEEE 802.11 and IEEE 802.11s
  • 2.1.2. Implementation Support
  • 2.2. Background
  • 2.2.1. Routing Protocols
  • 2.2.1.1. Proactive Routing Protocols
  • 2.2.1.2. Reactive Routing Protocols
  • 2.2.2. Path-Selection Protocols
  • 2.3. Securing Routing and Path Selection
  • 2.3.1. Threat Model
  • 2.3.1.1. Threats Posed by Outsider Attacks
  • 2.3.1.2. Threats Posed by Compromised Nodes
  • 2.3.2. Attacks against Routing and Path Selection
  • 2.3.2.1. Rushing Attacks
  • 2.3.2.2. Gray Holes and Black Holes
  • 2.3.2.3. Wormholes
  • 2.3.3. Defenses
  • 2.3.3.1. Authenticated Routing
  • 2.3.3.2. Pathrater/Watchdog
  • 2.3.3.3. Packet Leashes
  • 2.4. Future Directions for Research
  • 2.4.1. Secure MAC Protocols
  • 2.4.2. Distance-Bounding Protocols
  • 2.4.3. Secure Neighbor Discovery
  • 2.5. Conclusions
  • Terminologies
  • Questions and Sample Answers
  • Author's Biography
  • References
  • 3. Handling Security Threats to the RFID System of EPC Networks / Evangelos Kranakis
  • 3.1. Introduction
  • 3.1.1. Background
  • 3.2. Threat Analysis Methodology
  • 3.3. Evaluation of Threats
  • 3.3.1. Authenticity Threats
  • 3.3.2. Integrity and Availability Threats
  • 3.4. Survey of RFID Security Defences
  • 3.4.1. Hardware-Based Primitives
  • 3.4.2. Software Protocols
  • 3.5. Future Directions for Research
  • 3.6. Conclusions
  • Acknowledgments
  • Terminologies
  • Questions and Sample Answers
  • Author's Biography
  • References
  • 4. Survey of Anomaly Detection Algorithms: Toward Self-Learning Networks / Rumana Rahman
  • 4.1. Introduction
  • 4.2. Background
  • 4.3. Future Directions for Research: Adaptive, Online Algorithms
  • 4.3.1. Foundations
  • 4.3.2. LS Estimation Techniques
  • 4.3.2.1. Algorithms Using Updating of the Covariance Matrix
  • 4.3.2.2. Algorithms Using Orthogonal Transformations
  • 4.3.2.3. Algorithms Using Updating of the Information Matrix
  • 4.3.2.4. Algorithms Using Updating and Downdating of the QR Decompositions
  • 4.3.2.5. Error Analysis
  • 4.3.2.6. Time-Varying Parameter Estimation
  • 4.3.2.7. Applications
  • 4.3.3. Kernel Versions of LS Techniques
  • 4.3.4. Adaptive, Online Algorithms Based on LS Techniques
  • 4.3.5. Other Online and Adaptive Algorithms
  • 4.4. Conclusions
  • Terminologies
  • Questions and Sample Answers
  • Author's Biography
  • References
  • 5. Reputation- and Trust-Based Systems for Wireless Self-Organizing Networks / Jaydip Sen
  • 5.1. Introduction
  • 5.2. Trust-Definition and Concepts
  • 5.3. Trust in Wireless Self-Organizing Networks
  • 5.3.1. Wireless Self-Organizing Networks
  • 5.3.2. Misbehavior of Nodes
  • 5.3.3. Effects of Nodes' Misbehavior
  • 5.4. Reputation- and Trust-Based Systems
  • 5.4.1. Trust and its Characteristics
  • 5.4.2. Reputation Systems: Goals and Properties
  • 5.4.3. Classification of Reputation- and Trust-Based Systems
  • 5.5. Issues in Reputation Systems for Wireless Communication Networks
  • 5.5.1. Information Gathering
  • 5.5.2. Information Dissemination
  • 5.5.3. Redemption and Weighting of Time
  • 5.5.4. Weighting of Second-Hand Information
  • 5.5.5. Spurious Ratings
  • 5.5.6. Identity
  • 5.5.7. Detection
  • 5.5.8. Response
  • 5.6. Examples of Reputation and Trust-based Models
  • 5.6.1. Watchdog and Pathrater
  • 5.6.2. Context-Aware Inference Mechanism
  • 5.6.3. Trust-Based Relationship of Nodes in Ad Hoc Networks
  • 5.6.4. Trust Aggregation Scheme
  • 5.6.5. Trust Management in Ad Hoc Networks
  • 5.6.6. Trusted Routing Schemes
  • 5.6.7. Collaborative Reputation Mechanism in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
  • 5.6.8. Cooperation of Nodes-Fairness in Dynamic Ad Hoc Networks
  • 5.6.9. Observation-Based Cooperation Enhancement in Ad Hoc Networks
  • 5.6.10. Robust Reputation System
  • 5.6.11. Reputation-Based Framework for High-Integrity Sensor Networks
  • 5.6.12. Distributed Reputation-Based Beacon Trust System
  • 5.7. Open Problems
  • 5.8. Conclusion
  • Terminologies
  • Questions and Sample Answers
  • Author's Biography
  • References
  • pt. II MOBILE AD HOC NETWORK AND VEHICULAR AD HOC NETWORK SECURITY
  • 6. Security Threats in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks / Juan E.
  • Tapiador
  • 6.1. Introduction
  • 6.2. Background
  • 6.2.1. Vulnerabilities of Manets
  • 6.2.2. AODV Routing Protocol
  • 6.3. Attacks on MANET
  • 6.3.1. Adversary Model
  • 6.3.2. Attacks
  • 6.3.2.1. Passive Attacks
  • 6.3.2.2. Active Attacks
  • 6.4. Countermeasures
  • 6.4.1. Prevention Techniques: Secure Routing
  • 6.4.2. Intrusion Detection
  • 6.4.2.1. Specification-Based Intrusion Detection
  • 6.4.2.2. Anomaly-Based Intrusion Detection
  • 6.4.2.3. Misuse-Based Intrusion Detection
  • 6.4.2.4. Promiscuous Monitoring-Based Intrusion Detection
  • 6.5. Future Directions for Research
  • 6.6. Conclusions
  • Terminologies
  • Questions and Sample Answers
  • Author's Biography
  • References
  • 7. Key Management in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks / Sumit Goswami
  • 7.1. Introduction
  • 7.1.1. MANET: Introduction and Application
  • 7.1.2. Ad Hoc Network Security
  • 7.1.3. Key Management
  • 7.2. Background
  • 7.2.1. Security Issues in Wired versus Ad Hoc Network
  • 7.2.2. Design Issues
  • 7.2.3. Key Management Challenges
  • 7.3. Key Management in MANET
  • 7.3.1. Hierarchical Model
  • 7.3.2. Threshold Model
  • 7.3.2.1. Threshold Public Key Management with Partially Distributed Authority
  • 7.3.2.2. Distributed CA Based on Threshold Scheme
  • 7.3.2.3. Public Key Management Based on Identity Threshold
  • 7.3.3. Self-Organized Public Key Management
  • 7.3.4. Mobile Ad Hoc Key Revocation Server Scheme
  • 7.3.4.1. Discovery of MAKeRS in a ZoNA
  • 7.3.4.2. Message Format for Neighbor Discovery
  • 7.3.4.3. Server Discovery Algorithm
  • 7.3.4.4. Protocols
  • 7.4. Future Directions for Research
  • 7.5. Conclusions
  • Questions and Sample Answers
  • 8. Combating against Security Attacks against Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (Manets) / Marcus Scholler
  • 8.1. Introduction
  • 8.2. Background: Attack Taxonomy
  • 8.3. Network Layer Attacks against MANETs
  • 8.3.1. Wormhole Attack
  • 8.3.1.1. Countermeasures against the Wormhole Attack
  • 8.3.2. Blackhole Attack
  • 8.3.2.1. Countermeasures against the Blackhole Attack
  • 8.3.3. Byzantine Attack
  • 8.3.3.1. Byzantine Attack Prevention
  • 8.3.4. Rushing Attack
  • 8.3.4.1. Rushing Attack Solution
  • 8.3.5. Resource Consumption Attack
  • 8.3.5.1. Resource Consumption Attack Prevention
  • 8.3.6. Link Withholding and Link-Spoofing Attacks
  • 8.3.7. Replay Attacks
  • 8.4. Transport Layer Attacks against MANET
  • 8.4.1. SYN Flooding Attack
  • 8.4.2. Session Hijacking Attack
  • 8.5. Case Studies
  • 8.5.1. Collusion Attack against OLSR-Based MANETs
  • 8.5.2. Detecting Wormhole Attacks against OLSR Protocols
  • 8.6. Open Issues and Future Directions of Research
  • 8.6.1. Intrusion Detection and Prevention
  • 8.6.2. Cryptographic Techniques
  • 8.6.3. Resiliency
  • 8.7. Conclusions
  • Terminologies
  • Questions and Sample Answers
  • Author's Biography
  • References
  • 9. Classification of Attacks on Wireless Mobile Ad Hoc Networks and Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks: A Survey / Arobinda Gupta
  • 9.1. Introduction
  • 9.2. Attacks at the Physical Layer
  • 9.3. Attacks at the MAC Layer
  • 9.3.1. Selfish Misbehavior of Nodes
  • 9.3.2. Malicious Behavior of Nodes
  • 9.3.3. Other Classifications
  • 9.3.3.1. Internal versus External Attacks
  • 9.3.3.2. Active versus Passive Attacks
  • 9.3.4. Discussion and Analysis
  • 9.4. Attacks at the Network Layer
  • 9.4.1. Other Classifications
  • 9.4.2. Discussion and Analysis
  • 9.5. Attacks at the Transport Layer
  • 9.6. Attacks at the Application Layer
  • 9.7. Attacks on VANET
  • 9.8. Conclusion
  • Terminologies
  • Questions and Sample Answers
  • Author's Biography
  • References
  • 10. Security in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks / Mozaffar Afaque
  • 10.1. Introduction
  • 10.2. Vehicular Networks: An Overview
  • 10.3. Background: Need for Security
  • 10.3.1. Security Requirements
  • 10.3.2. Challenges.
  • Note continued: 10.3.3. Adversaries
  • 10.3.4. Attacks
  • 10.3.5. VANET Properties Supporting Security
  • 10.4. Security in VANETs
  • 10.5. Central Authorities and Vehicular PKI
  • 10.6. Secure Computing Platform: Hardware and Software for a Secure VANET Node
  • 10.7. Implementing Message Authentication and Integrity Using Digital Signatures
  • 10.8. How is Privacy and Identity Management being Handled
  • 10.9. Certificate Revocation
  • 10.10. Secure Aggregation of Data
  • 10.11. Detection of Malicious Data and Secure Position Verification
  • 10.12. Future Directions for Research
  • 10.13. Conclusions
  • Terminologies
  • Questions and Sample Answers
  • Author's Biography
  • References
  • 11. Toward a Robust Trust Model for Ensuring Security and Privacy in Vanets / Syed Ishtiaque Ahmed
  • 11.1. Introduction
  • 11.2. Background/Related Works
  • 11.3. Trust Model for VANET Preliminaries
  • 11.3.1. Characteristics of Trust Models and its Metrics
  • 11.3.2. Objectives of VANETs
  • 11.3.3. Components and Key Characteristics of VANETs
  • 11.3.4. Adversary Model for VANETs
  • 11.3.5. Salient Features of Trust Metrics in Distributed Systems and VANETs
  • 11.4. State of the Art: Data Centric Trust Management Model
  • 11.4.1. Preliminaries
  • 11.4.2. Framework
  • 11.4.3. Dynamic Factors
  • 11.4.4. Decision Logic
  • 11.4.4.1. Majority Voting
  • 11.4.4.2. Most Trusted Report
  • 11.4.4.3. Weighted Voting
  • 11.4.4.4. Bayesian Inference
  • 11.4.4.5. Dempster-Shafer Theory
  • 11.4.4.6. Application of Decision Logic
  • 11.5. Challenges and Questions
  • 11.6. Future Directions
  • 11.7. Conclusion
  • Terminologies
  • Questions and Sample Answers
  • Author's Biography
  • References
  • 12. Sybil Attack in Vanets: Detection and Prevention / V. Laxmi
  • 12.1. Introduction
  • 12.2. VANET Architecture
  • 12.3. Attacks on Vehicular Networks
  • 12.3.1. Classification of Attackers
  • 12.3.2. Types of Attacks
  • 12.3.3. Security Requirements
  • 12.4. Sybil Attack
  • 12.5. Trust Establishment
  • 12.5.1. Infrastructure-Based Trust Establishment
  • 12.5.2. Dynamic Trust Establishment
  • 12.5.2.1. History-Based Trust Establishment
  • 12.5.2.2. Self-Certified Pseudonym-Based Trust Establishment
  • 12.5.3. Analysis of Trust Establishment Approaches
  • 12.6. Detection of Sybil Attack
  • 12.6.1. Resource Testing
  • 12.6.2. Public Key Cryptography
  • 12.6.3. Passive Detection through Single Observer
  • 12.6.4. Passive Detection through Multiple Observers
  • 12.6.5. Sybil Node Detection by Propagation Model
  • 12.6.6. Active Detection by Position Verification
  • 12.6.7. Sensor-Based Position Verification
  • 12.6.8. Analysis of Sybil Detection Solutions
  • 12.7. Future Directions for Research
  • 12.8. Conclusion
  • Terminologies
  • Questions and Sample Answers
  • Author's Biography
  • References
  • pt. III WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORK SECURITY
  • 13. Key Management Schemes of Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey / Sungyoung Lee
  • 13.1. Introduction
  • 13.2. Background
  • 13.3. Security Threats in Wireless Sensor Networks
  • 13.4. Key Management
  • 13.5. Future Directions of Research
  • 13.6. Conclusions
  • Terminologies
  • Questions and Sample Answers
  • Author's Biography
  • References
  • 14. Key Management Techniques for Wireless Sensor Networks: Practical and Theoretical Considerations / Yannis C. Stamatiou
  • 14.1. Introduction and Background
  • 14.1.1. Single Network-Wide Key
  • 14.1.2. Pairwise Key Establishment Scheme
  • 14.1.3. Random Key Predistribution
  • 14.1.3.1. Basic Scheme
  • 14.1.3.2. q-Composite Random Key Predistribution Scheme
  • 14.1.4. Deterministic Key Distribution
  • 14.1.5. Combinatorial Key Predistribution
  • 14.1.5.1. Set-Based Constructions for Key Predistribution
  • 14.1.5.2. Constructions Based on Hadamard Matrices
  • 14.2. Advanced Concepts for Key Management and Trust in WSNs
  • 14.2.1. Random Graph Models
  • 14.2.2. Randomized Scheme Based on the Fixed Radius Model
  • 14.2.2.1. Random Points in Euclidean Spaces
  • 14.2.2.2. Key Predistribution Scheme Based on Random Points on Circular Disks
  • 14.2.3. First-Order Language of Graphs
  • 14.2.4. Second-Order Language of Graphs
  • 14.2.5. Undecidable Probabilities
  • 14.2.6. Set Systems Based on Special Polynomials
  • 14.2.6.1. Some Definitions
  • 14.2.6.2. BBR Polynomials
  • 14.3. Conclusions
  • Terminologies
  • Questions and Sample Answers
  • Author's Biography
  • References
  • 15. Bio-Inspired Intrusion Detection for Wireless Sensor Networks / Fatma Mili
  • 15.1. Introduction
  • 15.1.1. Security Robustness Characteristics of Sensor Networks
  • 15.1.2. Security Vulnerability Characteristics of Sensor Networks
  • 15.2. Background
  • 15.2.1. Types of DoS Attacks that an IDS Must Deter
  • 15.2.2. Elements of a DoS Intruder Detection System
  • 15.2.3. Approaches to DoS Intruder Detection
  • 15.2.3.1. IDS Based on Deviation from Normal
  • 15.2.3.2. Selective Forwarding Attack Detection Scheme
  • 15.2.4. Summary Anomaly-Based IDS Systems for WSNs
  • 15.3. Natural and Artificial Immune Systems, General Principles
  • 15.3.1. Natural Immune Systems
  • 15.3.2. Artificial Immune Systems
  • 15.4. Representative Sample of AIS for Sensor Networks
  • 15.4.1. Sample Implementation of the Innate Immune System
  • 15.4.1.1. Background
  • 15.4.1.2. Immunity Layer Simulated
  • 15.4.1.3. Characterization of Intruders (Self vs. Non-self)
  • 15.4.1.4. Identifying Intruders and Ensuing Processes
  • 15.4.1.5. General Assessment and Simulation Results
  • 15.4.2. Example Implementation of an Adaptive Immune System: Immunity-Based Intrusion Detection for WSNs
  • 15.4.2.1. Background, Motivation
  • 15.4.2.2. Immunity Layer Simulated
  • 15.4.2.3. Characterization of Intruders (Self vs. Non-self)
  • 15.4.2.4. Identifying Intruders and Ensuing Processes
  • 15.4.2.5. General Assessment and Simulation Results
  • 15.4.3. Example Implementation of Danger Theory: An Artificial Immune System Approach with Secondary Response
  • 15.4.3.1. Background, Motivation
  • 15.4.3.2. Layer Simulated
  • 15.4.3.3. Characterization of Intruders (Self vs. Non-self)
  • 15.4.3.4. Identification of Intruders
  • 15.4.3.5. Assessment and Simulation Results
  • 15.4.4. Adaptive Immunity for WSNs
  • 15.4.4.1. Motivation
  • 15.4.4.2. Determining "Self"
  • 15.4.4.3. Simulation Examples
  • 15.5. Future Directions for Research
  • 15.6. Conclusions
  • Terminologies
  • Questions and Sample Answers
  • Author's Biography
  • References
  • 16. Biological Inspired Autonomously Secure Mechanism for Wireless Sensor Networks / Rozeha A.
  • Rashid
  • 16.1. Introduction
  • 16.1.1. IEEE 802.15.4
  • 16.1.2. Types of Applications
  • 16.1.3. Resource Constraint
  • 16.1.4. Self-Organization
  • 16.1.5. Objectives
  • 16.1.6. Organization of the Chapter
  • 16.2. Background and Related Research
  • 16.2.1. Overview of Ant Routing in WSNs
  • 16.2.2. Comparison of the Most Recent ANT-Based Routing in WSNs
  • 16.2.3. Security in WSNs
  • 16.2.3.1. Spoofed, Altered, or Replayed Routing Information
  • 16.2.3.2. Selective Forwarding
  • 16.2.3.3. Sinkhole Attacks
  • 16.2.3.4. Sybil Attacks
  • 16.2.3.5. Wormholes
  • 16.2.3.6. HELLO Flood Attack
  • 16.2.3.7. Acknowledgment Spoofing
  • 16.2.4. Overview of IDS-Based Security
  • 16.2.5. Overview of AIS-Based Security
  • 16.2.6. Overview of Keying-Based Security
  • 16.2.7. Comparison of the Most Common Secure Routing Protocols in WSNs
  • 16.3. Methodology
  • 16.3.1. System Design
  • 16.3.2. Routing Management
  • 16.3.3. Neighbor Management
  • 16.3.4. Power Management
  • 16.3.5. Forwarding Criteria
  • 16.3.6. Optimal Route Discovery
  • 16.3.7. Determination of Packet Velocity
  • 16.3.8. Determination of Link Quality
  • 16.3.9. Security Management
  • 16.4. Simulation
  • 16.4.1. Simulation Tools
  • 16.4.2. Graphical Animation of the Network
  • 16.4.3. Network Model and Performance Parameters
  • 16.5. Results
  • 16.5.1. Performance Analysis
  • 16.6. Future Directions for Research
  • 16.7. Conclusion
  • Acknowledgment
  • Terminologies
  • Questions and Sample Answers
  • Author's Biography
  • References
  • 17. Controlled Link Establishment Attack on Key Pre-Distribution Schemes for Distributed Sensor Networks and Countermeasures / Johnson I. Agbinya
  • 17.1. Introduction
  • 17.2. Background on PKPSs for DSNs
  • 17.2.1. Mathematical Model
  • 17.2.2. Expected Properties of PKPSs
  • 17.2.3. State-of-the-Art of PKPSs
  • 17.3. Controlled Link Establishment Attack
  • 17.3.1. Node Replication Attack
  • 17.3.2. Key-Swapping Collusion Attack
  • 17.3.2.1. Short-Distance Collusion Attack
  • 17.3.2.2. Long-Distance Collusion Attack
  • 17.3.2.3. Mixed-Distance Collusion Attack
  • 17.4. Countermeasures
  • 17.4.1. Indirect Countermeasures
  • 17.4.2. Direct Countermeasures
  • 17.4.2.1. Witness-Based Detection Schemes
  • 17.4.2.2. SET: Set Operation-Based Detection Scheme
  • 17.4.2.3. Bloom Filter-Based Detection Scheme
  • 17.4.2.4. One-Way Hash Chain-Based Protection Schemes
  • 17.5. Future Research Directions
  • 17.6. Conclusions
  • Terminologies
  • Questions and Sample Answers
  • Author's Biography
  • References
  • 18. Proactive Key Variation Owing to Dynamic Clustering (Periodic) in Sensor Networks / Gihwan Cho
  • 18.1. Introduction
  • 18.2. Background
  • 18.2.1. Nonrenewal Schemes
  • 18.2.2. Reactive Renewal Schemes
  • 18.2.3. Secure CH Election Schemes.
  • Note continued: 18.3. Network and Threat Model
  • 18.3.1. Network Model
  • 18.3.2. Threat Model
  • 18.4. Proactive Key Variation Owing to Dynamic Clustering Scheme
  • 18.4.1. Sector Formation
  • 18.4.2. Pairwise Key Establishments within Sectors
  • 18.4.3. Secure CH Election
  • 18.4.3.1. Commitment Broadcast
  • 18.4.3.2. Broadcast of Fulfillment Value
  • 18.4.3.3. Sum Generation and CH Election
  • 18.4.3.4. Adjustment of Broadcast Order
  • 18.4.4. Transmission of Sensed Data
  • 18.5. Evaluation
  • 18.5.1. Security Evaluation
  • 18.5.2. Efficiency Evaluation
  • 18.6. Synchronization and Scalability
  • 18.7. Future Directions for Research
  • 18.8. Conclusions
  • Terminologies
  • Questions and Sample Answers
  • Author's Biography
  • References
  • 19. Secure Routing Architectures Using Cross-Layer Information for Attack Avoidance (with Case Study on Wormhole Attacks) / David Pearce
  • 19.1. Introduction
  • 19.1.1. Overview of Sensor Networks
  • 19.1.2. Overview of Sensor Network Security Issues
  • 19.1.3. Techniques for Defending WSN Systems
  • 19.1.4. Wormhole Attack
  • 19.1.4.1. Wormhole Attack Classifications
  • 19.1.4.2. Response to Wormhole Attacks
  • 19.1.5. Chapter Overview
  • 19.2. Background
  • 19.2.1. Background Overview
  • 19.2.2. Packet Leashing Approaches
  • 19.2.3. Approaches Involving Additional Hardware
  • 19.2.4. Sink-Based Approaches
  • 19.2.5. Graph-Theory Approaches
  • 19.2.6. Spectral Monitoring Approaches
  • 19.2.7. Unexpected Security Benefits from Wormholes
  • 19.3. Current Research Progress
  • 19.3.1. Introduction to Current Research
  • 19.3.2. Philosophy Behind Disturbance
  • 19.3.2.1. Passive Wormholes and Static Disturbance
  • 19.3.2.2. Dynamic Disturbance for Detection
  • 19.3.3. Metric Definition
  • 19.3.3.1. Static Metric Definition
  • 19.3.3.2. Dynamic Metric Definition
  • 19.3.4. Protocol Logic and Implementation
  • 19.3.5. Scenario Description
  • 19.3.5.1. Scenario Introduction
  • 19.3.5.2. Mobility Parameters
  • 19.3.5.3. Geometry Parameters for Deployment Region
  • 19.3.5.4. Wormhole Placement Parameters
  • 19.3.5.5. Simulation Logic
  • 19.3.5.6. Success Metric Tracked by a Simulator
  • 19.3.6. Results
  • 19.3.6.1. Varying the Static Routing Exponents
  • 19.3.6.2. Using Static Disturbance in Topologies of Varying Regularity
  • 19.3.6.3. Relative Performance of Static and Dynamic Disturbance
  • 19.3.7. Customizing Metrics for Known Topologies
  • 19.3.8. Future Directions for Research
  • 19.3.8.1. Overview of Future Directions
  • 19.3.8.2. Application to the Sinkhole Attack
  • 19.4. Conclusions
  • Terminologies
  • Questions and Sample Answers
  • Author's Biography
  • References
  • 20. Reputation-Based Trust Systems in Wireless Sensor Networks / Hani Alzaid
  • 20.1. Introduction
  • 20.2. Security Concerns
  • 20.2.1. WSN Attacks
  • 20.2.2. Reputation Attacks
  • 20.3. Analysis Framework for Reputation Systems
  • 20.3.1. Information Gathering and Sharing
  • 20.3.2. Information Modeling
  • 20.3.3. Decision Making and Dissemination
  • 20.4. State-of-the-Art of Reputation-Based Trust Systems in WSNs
  • 20.4.1. Trust-Based Security System for Ubiquitous and Pervasive Computing Environments
  • 20.4.2. Reputation-Based Secure Data Aggregation in WSNs
  • 20.4.3. Trust Management Problem in Distributed WSNs
  • 20.4.4. Collaborative Reputation Mechanism to Enforce Node Cooperation in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
  • 20.4.5. Performance Analysis of the Confidant Protocol
  • 20.4.6. Distributed Reputation-Based Beacon Trust
  • 20.4.7. Reputation-Based Framework for High Integrity Sensor Networks
  • 20.4.8. Trust-Based Security for Wireless Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks
  • 20.4.9. Formal Reputation System for Trusting WSNs
  • 20.5. Comparison of Current Reputation-Based Systems in WSNs
  • 20.5.1. Classification Model
  • 20.5.2. Reputation Components Visibility
  • 20.5.3. Attack Visibility
  • 20.6. Conclusion
  • Terminologies
  • Questions and Sample Answers
  • Author's Biography
  • References
  • 21. Major Works on the Necessity and Implementations of PKC in WSNs: A Beginner's Note / Al-Sakib Khan Pathan
  • 21.1. Introduction
  • 21.2. PKC in WSNs
  • 21.3. Major Challenges to Implementing PKC in WSNs
  • 21.3.1. Survey on the Notable Implementations of PKC in WSNs
  • 21.3.1.1. Types of Implementations
  • 21.3.1.2. Software Implementations
  • 21.3.1.3. Hardware Implementations
  • 21.3.1.4. Hardware/Software-Blended Implementations
  • 21.3.2. Summary of Implementations
  • 21.4. Conclusions and Future Expectations
  • Terminologies
  • Questions and Sample Answers
  • Author's Biography
  • References
  • pt. IV WIRELESS MESH NETWORK SECURITY
  • 22. Secure Access Control and Authentication in Wireless Mesh Networks / Ranga Reddy
  • 22.1. Introduction
  • 22.2. Background
  • 22.2.1. Wireless Mesh Network
  • 22.2.2. Authentication Schemes in WLANs
  • 22.2.2.1. IEEE 802.1X Authentication
  • 22.2.2.2. IEEE 802.1X Limitations
  • 22.3. Access Control and Authentication in WMN
  • 22.3.1. Authentication-Related Security Attacks
  • 22.3.2. Secure Authentication Assumptions
  • 22.3.3. Requirements for Authentication in WMNs
  • 22.3.3.1. Security Requirements
  • 22.3.3.2. Performance Requirements
  • 22.4. Access Control and Authentication Schemes
  • 22.4.1. Localized Authentication Based on Public Certificate
  • 22.4.2. Predictive Authentication and Preauthentication
  • 22.4.3. EAP-based Authentication Schemes for WMNs
  • 22.4.4. Identity-Based Cryptography-Based Authentication
  • 22.4.4.1. Identity-Based Cryptography
  • 22.4.4.2. ID-Based Authentication in WMNs
  • 22.5. Future Directions for Research
  • 22.6. Conclusions
  • Terminologies
  • Questions and Sample Answers
  • Author's Biography
  • References
  • 23. Misbehavior Detection in Wireless Mesh Networks / Md. Shariful Islam.

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