The future's back : nuclear rivalry, deterrence theory, and crisis stability after the Cold War /

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The Future's Back provides a valuable framework for organizing and evaluating research on superpower rivalry and nuclear deterrence. Arguing that previous critiques of rational choice and deterrence theory are unconvincing, Frank Harvey constructs a new set of empirical tests of rational deterr...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Harvey, Frank P. (Autor)
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Montreal : McGill-Queen's University Press, [1997]
Temas:
Since 1989
Deterrence (Strategy)
Nuclear warfare.
World politics > 1989-
Nuclear crisis stability.
Nuclear crisis control.
Security, International.
Nuclear Warfare
Stabilité nucléaire.
Guerre nucléaire > Prévention.
Dissuasion (Stratégie)
Sécurité internationale.
Guerre nucléaire.
Politique mondiale > 1989-
nuclear wars.
POLITICAL SCIENCE > International Relations > Arms Control.
HISTORY > Modern > 20th Century.
Security, International
Nuclear crisis stability
Nuclear crisis control
Nuclear warfare
World politics
Ost-West-Konflikt
Beendigung
Kernwaffe
Machtpolitik
Abschreckung
Militärpolitik
Militärisches Gleichgewicht
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • 1. Cumulation in International Relations: Methodological Constraints and Solutions
  • 2. Nuclear Deterrence: The Record of Aggregate Testing
  • 3. New Directions for Aggregate Testing
  • 4. Game Theory and Superpower Rivalry, 1948-88
  • 5. U.S.-Soviet Rivalry and Nuclear Deterrence
  • 6. Nuclear Stability after the Cold War
  • 7. Conventional Deterrence and Compellence Theory: Perspectives on Testing after the Cold War.

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