Simple, implementable fiscal policy rules /
This paper analyzes the scope for systematic rules-based fiscal activism in open economies. Relative to a balanced budget rule, automatic stabilizers significantly improve welfare. But they minimize fiscal instrument volatility rather than business cycle volatility. A more aggressively countercyclic...
Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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Autores principales: | , |
Autor Corporativo: | |
Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
Idioma: | Inglés |
Publicado: |
[Washington, DC] :
International Monetary Fund (IMF),
©2009.
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Colección: | IMF working paper ;
WP/09/76. |
Temas: | |
Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- I. Introduction; II. Literature Survey; III. The Model; A. Households; 1. Infinitely Lived Households; 2. Liquidity Constrained Households; B. Manufacturing; C. Copper Production; D. Distribution; E. Government; 1. Monetary Policy; 2. Fiscal Policy; F. Fiscal Policy Rules; 1. Chile's Structural Surplus Rule; 2. A Tax Revenue Gap Targeting Rule; 3. A Tax Revenue Gap Instrument Rule; G. Shocks; H. Equilibrium and Balance of Payments; I. Computation of Welfare; IV. Calibration; A. Steady State; B. Policy Rules, Adjustment Costs and Shocks; Tables; 1. Key Moments of the Data; V. Results
- A. Monetary RulesB. Impulse Responses; C. Welfare; D. Fiscal Instrument Volatility; E. Welfare
- Fiscal Instrument Volatility Efficiency Frontiers; F. Macroeconomic Volatility; G. Other Real Activity Gaps?; H. Openness; I. Alternative Fiscal Instruments; VI. Conclusion; Figures; 1. IRF for Technology Shock; 2. IRF for Investment Shock; 3. IRF for Copper Demand Shock; 4. Welfare for Tax Revenue Gap Rule; 5. Fiscal Instrument Volatility for Tax Revenue Gap Rule; 6. Efficiency Frontiers; 7. Macroeconomic Volatility for Tax Revenue Gap Rule; 8. Openness; 9. Welfare and Fiscal Instruments
- 10. Fiscal Volatility for Different Fiscal InstrumentsAppendices; 1. Optimality Conditions of the Model; 2. Welfare Computations; References