Common sense : a contemporary defense /

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In this 2004 book, Noah Lemos presents a strong defense of the common sense tradition, the view that we may take as data for philosophical inquiry many of the things we ordinarily think we know. He discusses the main features of that tradition as expounded by Thomas Reid, G.E. Moore and Roderick Chi...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Lemos, Noah Marcelino, 1956-
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Cambridge, UK ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Colección:Cambridge studies in philosophy.
Temas:
Common sense.
Knowledge, Theory of.
Sens commun.
Théorie de la connaissance.
epistemology.
Common sense
Knowledge, Theory of
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Cover
  • Dedication
  • Contents
  • Acknowledgments
  • Preface
  • 1 The Common Sense Tradition
  • 1.1 SOME MAIN FEATURES OF THE COMMON SENSE TRADITION
  • 1.2 EVIDENCE OR IRRESISTIBILITY?
  • 2 Common Sense and Reliability I
  • 2.1 TWO ASSUMPTIONS
  • 2.2 THE PROBLEM OF CIRCULARITY: ALSTON AND SOSA
  • 3 Common Sense and Reliability II
  • 3.1 FUMERTON'S OBJECTIONS
  • 3.2 VOGEL, ROXANNE, AND THE NEO-MOOREAN ARGUMENT
  • 3.3 FURTHER REFLECTIONS AND REFLECTIVE KNOWERS
  • 4 Reid, Reliability, and Reid's Wrong Turn
  • 4.1 REID ON OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE RELIABILITY OF OUR FACULTIES
  • 4.2 REID'S WRONG TURN
  • Argument A
  • 5 Moore, Skepticism, and the External World
  • 5.1 MOORE'S PROOF AND THE CHARGE OF QUESTION-BEGGING
  • 5.2 MOORE'S RESPONSE TO SKEPTICISM AND STROUD'S OBJECTION
  • 5.3 THE SENSITIVITY REQUIREMENT AND THE CONTEXTUALIST CRITICISM
  • 6 Chisholm, Particularism, and Methodism
  • 6.1 CHISHOLM AND THE PROBLEM OF THE CRITERION
  • 6.2 WHAT'S WRONG WITH METHODISM?
  • Argument A
  • 6.3 SUPERVENIENCE AND PARTICULAR EPISTEMIC BELIEFS
  • 6.4 MOSER'S CRITICISM OF PARTICULARISM
  • 6.5 BONJOUR'S CRITICISM OF PARTICULARISM
  • 6.6 BUTCHVAROV'S OBJECTION
  • 7 Common Sense and A Priori Epistemology
  • 7.1 CHISHOLM ON EPISTEMIC PRINCIPLES AND A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE
  • Argument A
  • Argument B
  • 7.2 MODEST A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE
  • 7.3 LYCAN'S DEFENSE OF THE MOOREAN RESPONSE TO SKEPTICISM
  • 7.4 MODEST A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE AND COMMON SENSE PARTICULARISM
  • 8 Particularism, Ethical Skepticism, and Moral Philosophy
  • 8.1 SOME CRITICISMS OF WIDE REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM AND PARTICULARISM
  • 8.2 JUSTIFIED BELIEF ABOUT PARTICULAR ACTIONS RECONSIDERED
  • Argument A
  • Argument B
  • Conclusion
  • Selected Bibliography
  • Index
  • Last Page.

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