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Fiscal incentive effects of the German equalization system /
Does reliance on transfers weaken fiscal discipline and encourage pro-cyclical fiscal policies in recipient subnational governments? Using fiscal reaction functions for a panel of the German Länder, this paper finds a positive answer to both questions. Net-recipient states (Länder, benefiting from...
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
|---|---|
| Autores principales: | , |
| Autor Corporativo: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
[Washington, D.C.] :
International Monetary Fund,
©2009.
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| Colección: | IMF working paper ;
WP/09/124. |
| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- I. Introduction; II. Fiscal Discipline and Fiscal Transfers: A Difficult Nexus; Figures; 1. Subnational Shares in Total Spending and Revenue, 2006; 2. Comparative Composition of Subnational Revenue; A. Germany's Transfer System; 3. Net Contributing and Net Receiving Länder; 4. Evolution of the Transfer System; B. Potential Implications of Transfers; 5. Debt by Government Level; 6: Länder Debt; III. Framework, Methodology, and Data; A. The Inter-Temporal Budget Constraint; B. Cyclicality; C. Data; IV. Empirical Analysis; Tables; 1. Germany: Descriptive Statistics, 1985-2007.
- A. Univariate Analysis: Fiscal Reaction Functions2. Fiscal Behavior of the Old Länder, 1985-2007; 3. Behavior of Primary Expenditure for Länder, 1985-2007; 4. Robustness Check I: Behavior of Primary Expenditure for Länder, 1985-2007; B. Multivariate Analysis: VARs; 5. Robustness Check II: Behavior of Primary Expenditure; 7. Länder Behavior and Average Received Transfers, 1985-2007; 8. Output Gap Shock; V. Policy Implications and Conclusions; 9. Primary Spending Shock; Appendix I; Appendix Table 6: Unit root tests; References.