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Fiscal incentive effects of the German equalization system /

Does reliance on transfers weaken fiscal discipline and encourage pro-cyclical fiscal policies in recipient subnational governments? Using fiscal reaction functions for a panel of the German Länder, this paper finds a positive answer to both questions. Net-recipient states (Länder, benefiting from...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autores principales: Stehn, Sven Jari (Autor), Fedelino, Annalisa (Autor)
Autor Corporativo: International Monetary Fund. Fiscal Affairs Department
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2009.
Colección:IMF working paper ; WP/09/124.
Temas:
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Descripción
Sumario:Does reliance on transfers weaken fiscal discipline and encourage pro-cyclical fiscal policies in recipient subnational governments? Using fiscal reaction functions for a panel of the German Länder, this paper finds a positive answer to both questions. Net-recipient states (Länder, benefiting from the transfer system) have not reduced primary expenditure significantly in response to rising deficits, but have instead relied on vertical transfers from the federal government to ensure debt sustainability. Moreover, they have pursued pro-cyclical policies, particularly by raising expenditures in g.
Notas:At head of title: Fiscal Affairs Department.
"June 2009."
Descripción Física:1 online resource (29 pages) : color illustrations.
Bibliografía:Includes bibliographical references (pages 27-29).
ISBN:1451917007
9781451917000
1462369898
9781462369898
1452761167
9781452761169
1282843389
9781282843387
1451872712
9781451872712
9786612843389
6612843381
ISSN:2227-8885 ;