New essays on the knowability paradox /
The knowability paradox suggests that wherever there is empirical ignorance there is also logically unknowable truth. This volume presents original papers in which this notorious problem was first set out, 19 papers seeking to resolve it, and a helpful introduction.
Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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Otros Autores: | |
Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
Idioma: | Inglés |
Publicado: |
Oxford :
Oxford University Press,
2009.
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Temas: | |
Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Early history
- Referee reports on Fitch's "definition of value" / Alonzo Church
- A logical analysis of some value concepts / Frederic B. Fitch
- Knowability noir, 1945--1963 / Joe Salerno
- Dummett's constructivism
- Fitch's paradox of knowability / Michael Dummett
- The paradox of knowability and the mapping objection / Stig Alstrup Rasmussen
- Truth, indefinite extensibility, and fitch's paradox / Jose Luis Bermudez
- Paraconsistency and paracompleteness
- Beyond the limits of knowledge / Graham Priest
- Knowability and possible epistemic oddities / J.C. Beall
- Epistemic and temporal operators : actions, times and types
- Actions that make us know / Johan van Benthem
- Can truth out? / Johnw Burgess
- Logical types in some arguments about knowability and belief / Bernard Linsky
- Cartesian restricted truth
- Tennant's troubles / Timothy Williamson
- Restriction strategies for knowability : some lessons in false hope / Jonathan L. Kvanvig
- Revamping the restriction strategy / Neil Tennant
- Modal and mathematical fictions
- On keeping blue swans and unknowable facts at bay : a case study on Fitch's paradox / Berit Brogaard
- Fitch's paradox and the philosophy of mathematics / Otavio Bueno
- Knowability reconsidered
- Performance and paradox / Michael Hand
- The mystery of the disappearing diamond / C.S. Jenkins
- Invincible ignorance / W.D. Hart
- Two deflationary approaches to fitch-style reasoning / Christoph Kelp and Duncan Pritchard
- Not every truth can be known (at least, not all at once) / Greg Restall.