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Order without law : how neighbors settle disputes /
Integrating the current research in law, economics, sociology, game theory and anthropology, this text demonstrates that people largely govern themselves by means of informal rules - social norms - without the need for a state or other central co-ordinator to lay down the law.
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Cambridge, Mass. ; London :
Harvard University Press,
1991
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| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Preface
- Contents
- Introduction
- Part I. Shasta County
- 1. Shasta County and Its Cattle Industry
- 2. The Politics of Cattle Trespass
- 3. The Resolution of Cattle-Trespass Disputes
- 4. Who Pays for Boundary Fences?
- 5. Disputes Arising out of Highway Collisions Involving Livestock
- 6. The Effects of Closed-Range Ordinances
- Part II. A Theory of Norms
- 7. The System of Social Control
- 8. Shortcomings of Current Theories of Social Control
- 9. The Puzzle of Cooperation
- 10. A Hypothesis of Welfare-Maximizing Norms
- 11. Substantive Norms: Of Bees, Cattle, and Whales12. Remedial Norms: Of Carrots and Sticks
- 13. Procedural and Constitutive Norms: Of Gossip, Ritual, and Hero Worship
- 14. Controller-Selecting Norms: Of Contracts, Custom, and Photocopies
- Part III. The Future of Norms
- 15. Testing the Content of Norms
- 16. Conclusions and Implications
- Appendix. Research Methods
- Index