Well-being : its meaning, measurement, and moral importance /

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Offers answers to three central questions about well-being: the best way to understand it; whether it can be measured; and where it should fit in moral and political thought.

Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Griffin, James, 1933-
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Oxford : New York : Clarendon Press ; Oxford Univ. Press, ©1986.
Temas:
Ethics.
Health.
Philosophy.
Health
Health > philosophy
Ethics
Philosophy
Morale.
Santé.
Philosophie.
ethics (philosophy)
health.
philosophy.
PHILOSOPHY > Social.
PHILOSOPHY > Ethics & Moral Philosophy.
Welzijn.
Meetmethoden.
Ethiek.
Qualité de la vie.
Man > Well-being > Ethical aspects
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Preface
  • Contents
  • Introduction
  • Part One: Meaning
  • I. Utilitarian Accounts: State of Mind or State of the World?
  • 1. Mental state accounts
  • 2. Sidgwick's compromise
  • 3. The actual-desire account
  • 4. The informed-desire account
  • 5. Troubles with the informed-desire account
  • 6. Is there something between mental state and desire accounts?
  • II. Utilitarian Accounts: The Desire Account Developed
  • 1. How may we restrict the desire account?
  • 2. Why we should resist restricting it more
  • 3. How value and desire are related
  • 4. A formal account.
  • 5. Maximization and the unity of life
  • 6. A (restricted) interest theory of value
  • 7. Is this account still utilitarian?
  • III. Objective Accounts
  • 1. Two concepts of well-being
  • 2. The need account
  • 3. Can we give a tolerably clear sense to 'basic need'?
  • 4. The link between need and obligation
  • 5. Avoiding distortions to moral thought
  • 6. A flexible need account
  • 7. Neutrality, objectivity, and moral depth
  • IV. Perfectionism and the Ends of Life
  • 1. Prudential perfectionism
  • 2. Moral perfectionism
  • 3. The ends of life
  • 4. How morality fits into prudence.
  • 5. What is the good point buried in perfectionism?
  • 6. The primacy of prudential value theory
  • Part Two: Measurement
  • V. Are There Incommensurable Values?
  • 1. On measuring well-being
  • 2. Moral incommensurables and prudential incommensurables
  • 3. Forms of incommensurability: (a) Incomparability
  • 4. (b) Trumping
  • 5. (c) Weighting
  • 6. (d) Discontinuity
  • 7. (e) Pluralism
  • VI. The Case of One person
  • 1. Is well-being the sort of thing that can be measured at all?
  • 2. An ordinal scale of well-being
  • 3. Pockets of cardinality.
  • 4. What powers of measurement do we actually need?
  • VII. The Case of Many Persons
  • 1. The link between conceptions of well-being and problems of comparability
  • 2. A natural proposal for comparability and a problem with it
  • 3. Can the problem be solved?
  • 4. Interpersonal comparisons of well-being
  • 5. Intrapersonal intertemporal comparisons
  • 6. Comparability on a social scale
  • Part Three: Moral Importance
  • VIII. From Prudence to Morality
  • 1. Morality as something alien
  • 2. (a) Morality and self-interest
  • 3. (b) Morality and personal aims
  • 4. (c) Morality and rationality.
  • 5. The nature of the self and the source of morality
  • IX. Equal Respect
  • 1. Equal respect and psychological realism
  • 2. The utilitarian view of equal respect
  • 3. The contractualist view of equal respect
  • 4. The two views compared
  • 5. A view of equal respect that allows some partiality
  • X. Fairness
  • 1. Two problems: fairness and the breadth of the moral outlook
  • 2. The consequentialist's problem of .nding a broad enough outlook
  • 3. The free-rider problem and a minimal solution
  • 4. The possibility of tougher, Kantian solutions
  • 5. The solution of an agent-centred deontology.

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