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Consciousness revisited : materialism without phenomenal concepts /
We are material beings in a material world, but we are also beings who have experiences and feelings. How can these subjective states be just a matter of matter? This book looks at this question and much more.
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Cambridge, Mass. :
MIT Press,
©2009.
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| Colección: | Representation and mind.
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| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Introduction
- Phenomenal consciousness. Preliminary remarks
- Phenomenal consciousness and self-representation
- The connection between phenomenal consciousness and creature consciousness
- Consciousness of things
- Real-world puzzle cases
- Why consciousness cannot be physical and why it must be. What is the thesis of physicalism?
- Why consciousness cannot be physical
- Why consciousness must be physical
- Physicalism and the appeal to phenomenal concepts. Some terminological points
- Why physicalists appeal to phenomenal concepts
- Various accounts of phenomenal concepts
- My earlier view on phenomenal concepts
- Are there any phenomenal concepts?
- Phenomenal concepts and Burgean intuitions
- Consequences for a priori physicalism
- The admissible contents of visual experience. The existential thesis
- The singular (when filled) thesis
- Kaplanianism
- The multiple-contents thesis
- The existential thesis revisited
- Still more on existential contents
- Conclusion
- Consciousness, seeing and knowing. Knowing things and knowing facts
- Nonconceptual content
- Why the phenomenal character of an experience is not one of its nonrepresentational properties
- Phenomenal character and representational content, part I
- Phenomenal character and representational content, part II
- Phenomenal character and our knowledge of it
- Solving the puzzles. Mary, Mary, how does your knowledge grow?
- The explanatory gap
- The hard problem
- The possibility of zombies
- Change blindness and the refrigerator light illusion. A closer look at the change-blindness hypotheses
- The "no-see-um" view
- Sperling and the refrigerator light
- Phenomenology and cognitive accessibility
- A further change-blindness experiment
- Another brick in the wall
- Privileged access, phenomenal character, and externalism. The threat to privileged access
- A Burgean thought experiment
- Social externalism for phenomenal character?
- A closer look at privileged access and incorrigibility
- How do I know that I am not a zombie?
- Phenomenal externalism.