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Incentives and political economy /

Annotation Mainstream economics has only recently recognized the need to incorporate political constraints into economic analysis intended for policy advisors. "Incentives and Political Economy" uses recent advances in contract theory to build a normative approach to constitutional design...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1947-2004
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2000.
Colección:Clarendon lectures in economics.
Temas:
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • 1. Introduction
  • I. Politicians as Informed Supervisors. 2. The Complete Contract Approach to Constitutional Design. 3. An Incentive Theory of the Separation of Powers. 4. Checks and Balances
  • II. Flexibility Versus Discretion in Constitutional Design. 5. Political Economy and Industrial Policy. 6. Political Economy and the Marginal Cost Pricing Controversy. 7. Toward a Political Theory of the Emergence of Environmental Incentive Regulation
  • III. Coalition Formation and Constitutional Design. 8. Optimal Constitutional Response to Coalition Formation. 9. Collusion and Decentralization. 10. Concluding Remarks. App.: Translations of Passages Quoted in French.