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Tense, reference, and worldmaking /

Using Reichenbach's (1947) theory of tenses and temporal structures as a point of departure, McGilvray modifies it to produce a theory of his own. Analysing the difficulties Reichenbach's theory has in explaining the relationship of a speaker to a world, he introduces a new model for this...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: McGilvray, James A. (James Alasdair), 1942-
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Montreal : McGill-Queen's University Press, ©1991.
Temas:
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Contents
  • Acknowledgments
  • Introduction
  • 1 THE BASIC TEMPORAL AND SEMANTIC STRUCTURE OF SENTENCES
  • 1.1 Temporal and Semantic Structure
  • 1.1.1 Temporal Structure
  • 1.1.2 Reichenbach's 1947 Formalism
  • 1.1.3 The 1947 Topology Supplemented
  • 1.1.4 The Natures of Speakers, Tokens, Perceiver-Describers, Companions, and Situations
  • 1.1.5 Persons, Competence, Groups, and Locations
  • 1.2 Applying the Theory
  • 1.2.1 Adverbials and Simple Sentences
  • 1.2.2 The Future Tense
  • 1.2.3 The Anterior and Posterior
  • 1.3 Tense Is Not an SE Relationship
  • 1.3.1 Tense Logic and the SE Relationship1.3.2 SE Relationships and the Consequences of Tenses
  • 2 COMPLEX SITUATIONS
  • 2.1 Propositional Attitudes
  • 2.1.1 The Structure in Detail
  • 2.1.2 An Epistemic Matter: Responsibility and Tense
  • 2.2 Modals, Epistemic and Root
  • 2.2.1 Root Modals
  • 2.2.2 Epistemic Modals
  • 2.3 'When'
  • 2.3.1 Conditioned Root Modals
  • 2.4 Iterative States: Habituals, Nomics, and Generalizations
  • 2.4.1 The Structure
  • 2.4.2 The Nomic Difference
  • 2.5 Conditionals and Arguments
  • 2.5.1 The Structure of the Standard Conditional2.5.2 The Subjunctive and Counterfactual Conditionals
  • 2.5.3 Arguments, Conditioned Root-Modal Iteratives, and the Storytelling We
  • 2.5.4 Conditionals, (A)s, Truth, and Scepticism
  • 3 MEANING, MEANINGFULNESS, AND REFERENCE
  • 3.1 Meaning and Meaningfulness
  • 3.2 Truth Conditions and Meaning
  • 3.3 Meaning as Referring
  • 3.3.1 Indexicality
  • 3.3.2 Exemplificational Reference to t, i[sub(s)], and p; Ties
  • 3.3.3 On Referring: Picturing Situations
  • 3.3.4 On Chomsky's Contribution
  • 4.3.4 Identifying Reference and the Autonomy of Contents4.4 Demonstrative Reference
  • 5 EXISTENCE AND TENSE
  • 5.1 Existence: An Overview
  • 5.1.1 Existence and Meaningfulness
  • 5.1.2 Towards a Criterion of Existence
  • 5.1.3 The Platonic Gambit
  • 5.1.4 Existence Sentences
  • 5.2 Mathematical Sentences, the Existence of Numbers, and Mathematical Truth
  • 6 SITUATIONS AND ASPECTS
  • 6.1 Situations
  • 6.1.1 Movements
  • 6.1.2 Processes (Including Activities)
  • 6.1.3 Changes
  • 6.1.4 States
  • 6.2 Imperfectives and Perfectives of Situations with Bounds