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Concepts : where cognitive science went wrong.
Renowned philosopher Fodor presents an original theory of the basic constituents of thought in this first volume of the Oxford Cognitive Science Series. He argues for an atomistic theory of concepts and demolishes rival theories.
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Autor Corporativo: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Oxford :
Oxford University Press,
1998.
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| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Preface
- Abbreviations and typographical conventions
- 1 Philosophical Introduction: The Background Theory
- 2 Unphilosophical Introduction: What Concepts Have To Be
- 3 The Demise of Definitions, Part I: The Linguist's Tale
- 4 The Demise of Definitions, Part II: The Philosopher's Tale
- 5 Prototypes and Compositionality
- Appendix 5A: Meaning Postulates
- Appendix 5B: The 'Theory Theory' of Concepts
- 6 Innateness and Ontology, Part I: The Standard Argument
- Appendix 6A: Similarity
- 7 Innateness and Ontology, Part II: Natural Kind Concepts.
- Appendix 7A: Round Squares
- Bibliography
- Author index
- A
- B
- C
- D
- F
- G
- H
- J
- K
- L
- M
- N
- O
- P
- Q
- R
- S
- T
- V
- W
- Z.