Designing federalism : a theory of self-sustainable federal institutions /
The design of federal states from Russia and the Ukraine to Canada and the European Union typically develops from a false set of assumptions regarding the institutional building blocks of such a state. Rather than any carefully delineated allocation of policy jurisdictions, the authors argue that a...
Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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Autor principal: | |
Otros Autores: | , |
Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
Idioma: | Inglés |
Publicado: |
Cambridge, UK ; New York :
Cambridge University Press,
2004.
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Temas: | |
Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- 1. Federations and the Theoretical Problem
- 2. Federal Bargaining
- 3. Two Cases of Uninstitutionalized Bargaining
- 4. Representation
- 5. Incentives
- 6. Political Parties in a Federal State
- 7. Institutional Sources of Federal Stability I
- 8. Institutional Sources of Federal Stability II
- 9. Designing Federalism.