|
|
|
|
LEADER |
00000cam a2200000 a 4500 |
001 |
EBOOKCENTRAL_ocm70143642 |
003 |
OCoLC |
005 |
20240329122006.0 |
006 |
m o d |
007 |
cr un||||||||| |
008 |
060620s2005 dcua ob 000 0 eng d |
010 |
|
|
|z 2005929183
|
040 |
|
|
|a COD
|b eng
|e pn
|c COD
|d OQP
|d COCUF
|d IDEBK
|d OCLCQ
|d DKDLA
|d MERUC
|d CCO
|d E7B
|d VRC
|d OCLCQ
|d FVL
|d LCS
|d OCLCQ
|d OCLCF
|d NLGGC
|d OCLCO
|d OCLCQ
|d YDXCP
|d EBLCP
|d OCLCQ
|d N$T
|d OCLCQ
|d AZK
|d MOR
|d OCLCO
|d PIFBR
|d ZCU
|d OCLCO
|d OCLCQ
|d OCLCO
|d OCLCQ
|d OCLCO
|d OCLCA
|d U3W
|d OCLCA
|d BUF
|d OCLCO
|d BRL
|d OCLCO
|d WRM
|d STF
|d OCLCQ
|d EZ9
|d ICG
|d MERER
|d CUY
|d VT2
|d OCLCO
|d AU@
|d OCLCQ
|d OCLCO
|d WYU
|d OCLCA
|d LVT
|d OCLCA
|d A6Q
|d DKC
|d OCLCO
|d OCLCQ
|d UX1
|d UKAHL
|d OCLCQ
|d OCLCA
|d UKCRE
|d OCLCE
|d VLY
|d INARC
|d OCLCQ
|d HF9
|d CNNOR
|d HS0
|d OCLCO
|d OCLCQ
|d OCLCO
|d OCLCL
|d OCLCQ
|d OCLCL
|
019 |
|
|
|a 439709455
|a 474138963
|a 488351766
|a 560278795
|a 648134198
|a 666984227
|a 697759776
|a 722541803
|a 728032714
|a 814474644
|a 961667558
|a 962594007
|a 988420236
|a 992114506
|a 1037508983
|a 1038572933
|a 1047572314
|a 1055345575
|a 1065120118
|a 1081211633
|a 1083553193
|a 1153466149
|a 1154617386
|a 1156385385
|a 1162424486
|a 1225578109
|a 1227637158
|a 1228577324
|a 1240517612
|a 1249253682
|
020 |
|
|
|a 9780309551663
|q (electronic bk.)
|
020 |
|
|
|a 0309551668
|q (electronic bk.)
|
020 |
|
|
|a 1280742216
|
020 |
|
|
|a 9781280742217
|
020 |
|
|
|a 9786610742219
|
020 |
|
|
|a 6610742219
|
020 |
|
|
|z 0309096618
|q (pbk.)
|
020 |
|
|
|z 9780309096614
|q (pbk.)
|
029 |
1 |
|
|a AU@
|b 000051339647
|
029 |
1 |
|
|a AU@
|b 000066765828
|
029 |
1 |
|
|a DEBBG
|b BV044051949
|
029 |
1 |
|
|a NZ1
|b 12047404
|
035 |
|
|
|a (OCoLC)70143642
|z (OCoLC)439709455
|z (OCoLC)474138963
|z (OCoLC)488351766
|z (OCoLC)560278795
|z (OCoLC)648134198
|z (OCoLC)666984227
|z (OCoLC)697759776
|z (OCoLC)722541803
|z (OCoLC)728032714
|z (OCoLC)814474644
|z (OCoLC)961667558
|z (OCoLC)962594007
|z (OCoLC)988420236
|z (OCoLC)992114506
|z (OCoLC)1037508983
|z (OCoLC)1038572933
|z (OCoLC)1047572314
|z (OCoLC)1055345575
|z (OCoLC)1065120118
|z (OCoLC)1081211633
|z (OCoLC)1083553193
|z (OCoLC)1153466149
|z (OCoLC)1154617386
|z (OCoLC)1156385385
|z (OCoLC)1162424486
|z (OCoLC)1225578109
|z (OCoLC)1227637158
|z (OCoLC)1228577324
|z (OCoLC)1240517612
|z (OCoLC)1249253682
|
042 |
|
|
|a dlr
|
043 |
|
|
|a n-us---
|
050 |
|
4 |
|a RC88.9.T47
|b N27 2005
|
060 |
|
4 |
|a 2006 D-928
|
060 |
|
4 |
|a WA 295
|b N2775r 2005
|
072 |
|
7 |
|a BUS
|x 032000
|2 bisacsh
|
072 |
|
7 |
|a SOC
|x 000000
|2 bisacsh
|
072 |
|
7 |
|a K
|2 bicssc
|
082 |
0 |
4 |
|a 363.34/97
|2 22
|
049 |
|
|
|a UAMI
|
110 |
2 |
|
|a National Research Council (U.S.).
|b Committee on Standards and Policies for Decontaminating Public Facilities Affected by Exposure to Harmful Biological Agents: How Clean Is Safe?
|
245 |
1 |
0 |
|a Reopening public facilities after a biological attack :
|b a decision making framework /
|c Committee on Standards and Policies for Decontaminating Public Facilities Affected by Exposure to Harmful Biological Agents: How Clean is Safe?, Division on Earth and Life Studies, Board on Life Sciences, National Research Council of the National Academies.
|
260 |
|
|
|a Washington, D.C. :
|b National Academies Press,
|c ©2005.
|
300 |
|
|
|a 1 online resource (xiii, 210 pages) :
|b illustrations
|
336 |
|
|
|a text
|b txt
|2 rdacontent
|
337 |
|
|
|a computer
|b c
|2 rdamedia
|
338 |
|
|
|a online resource
|b cr
|2 rdacarrier
|
347 |
|
|
|a data file
|
504 |
|
|
|a Includes bibliographical references.
|
505 |
0 |
0 |
|t Introduction --
|t 2001 attacks and cleanup --
|t Context of the study and charge to the Committee --
|t Content and structure --
|t Infectious disease threats --
|t Ability of microorganisms to infect people --
|t Infectious disease as a weapon --
|t Agents of concern to national security and public health --
|t Biological agents considered in this report --
|t Policy precedents in decontamination --
|t Microbial decontamination in food and water supplies --
|t Biosafety in microbiological and biomedical laboratories --
|t Environmental infection control in health care facilities -- Decontamination of U.S. Army Biological Warfare laboratories --
|t Development of Superfund and remediation plans --
|t Remediation experiences in the U.S. nuclear weapons complex --
|t Anthrax decontamination after the 2001 attacks: social and political context --
|t Uncertain science, certain social division --
|t Case study selection.
|
505 |
0 |
0 |
|t Framework for event management --
|t Hazard identification and assessment --
|t Identification of the agent --
|t Evaluating the state of the agent --
|t Evaluating the state of the contaminated building --
|t Factors influencing exposure to harmful biological agents in indoor environments --
|t Exposure --
|t Sources --
|t Building design and operations --
|t Heating, ventilating, and air conditioning systems --
|t Transport and fate of harmful biological agents --
|t Deposition --
|t Resuspension --
|t Preparing and operating buildings for a bioterrorism attack and subsequent operation --
|t Analyzing health risks --
|t Assessment of risks posed by a biological hazard --
|t Dose-response: principles and uncertainties --
|t Sampling strategies and technologies --
|t Sampling and identification --
|t General sampling plan for quantifying the extent of cleanup --
|t Decontamination practices and principles.
|
505 |
0 |
0 |
|t Processes for decontamination of harmful biological agents and other response options --
|t Decontamination of harmful biological agents by chemical and physical methods --
|t Examples of decontamination: Hart Senate Office Building and American Media International Building --
|t Safe reoccupation of a facility --
|t Planning for biological agent attack --
|t Buildings declared contaminated --
|t Harmful biological agents in a public facility: the airport scenario --
|t Planning can make a major difference --
|t All findings and recommendations --
|t Other relevant case studies --
|t Were the 2001 anthrax exposures consistent with dose-response: the case of the AMI building.
|
588 |
0 |
|
|a Print version record.
|
506 |
|
|
|3 Use copy
|f Restrictions unspecified
|2 star
|5 MiAaHDL
|
533 |
|
|
|a Electronic reproduction.
|b [Place of publication not identified]:
|c HathiTrust Digital Library.
|d 2020.
|5 MiAaHDL
|
538 |
|
|
|a Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002.
|u http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212
|5 MiAaHDL
|
583 |
1 |
|
|a digitized
|c 2020.
|h HathiTrust Digital Library
|l committed to preserve
|2 pda
|5 MiAaHDL
|
520 |
|
|
|a The anthrax attacks in fall 2001 spurred an extensive and costly decontamination effort where many decisions had to be made about which sites required cleanup, what method to use, how to determine the effectiveness of the cleanup, and how "clean" the building had to be for reoccupation. As part of a project funded by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and managed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the National Research Council was asked to consider the criteria that must be met for a cleanup to be declared successful, allowing the reoccupation of a facility. The report finds that efficiently sampling and characterizing a pathogen is critical for choosing the best remediation strategy. However, there should be no universal standard for deciding when a building is safe to re-enter because varying pathogen amounts and characteristics could require different strategies. The report offers a flowchart for decision-makers that includes questions about the characteristics of the pathogen; how far it has spread; whether it is transmissible between humans; and how long it will survive to pose a threat. The report also recommends that a risk-assessment approach be adopted as part of a strategy for achieving a "socially acceptable" standard for cleanup
|
546 |
|
|
|a English.
|
590 |
|
|
|a ProQuest Ebook Central
|b Ebook Central Academic Complete
|
650 |
|
0 |
|a Bioterrorism.
|
650 |
|
0 |
|a Emergency management
|z United States.
|
650 |
|
0 |
|a Civil defense
|z United States.
|
650 |
1 |
2 |
|a Biological Warfare
|x prevention & control
|
650 |
1 |
2 |
|a Decontamination
|x standards
|
650 |
2 |
2 |
|a Public Facilities
|
650 |
2 |
2 |
|a Civil Defense
|x organization & administration
|
651 |
|
2 |
|a United States
|
650 |
|
2 |
|a Bioterrorism
|
650 |
|
6 |
|a Bioterrorisme.
|
650 |
|
7 |
|a BUSINESS & ECONOMICS
|x Infrastructure.
|2 bisacsh
|
650 |
|
7 |
|a SOCIAL SCIENCE
|x General.
|2 bisacsh
|
650 |
|
7 |
|a Bioterrorism
|2 fast
|
650 |
|
7 |
|a Civil defense
|2 fast
|
650 |
|
7 |
|a Emergency management
|2 fast
|
651 |
|
7 |
|a United States
|2 fast
|1 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PBJtxgQXMWqmjMjjwXRHgrq
|
758 |
|
|
|i has work:
|a Reopening Public Facilities after a Biological Attack (Text)
|1 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PD3g7WPwrTWByfvHbXhtmxC
|4 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/ontology/hasWork
|
776 |
0 |
8 |
|i Print version:
|a National Research Council (U.S.). Committee on Standards and Policies for Decontaminating Public Facilities Affected by Exposure to Harmful Biological Agents: How Clean Is Safe?.
|t Reopening public facilities after a biological attack.
|d Washington, D.C. : National Academies Press, ©2005
|w (DLC) 2005929183
|
856 |
4 |
0 |
|u https://ebookcentral.uam.elogim.com/lib/uam-ebooks/detail.action?docID=3564102
|z Texto completo
|
938 |
|
|
|a Askews and Holts Library Services
|b ASKH
|n AH36566604
|
938 |
|
|
|a EBL - Ebook Library
|b EBLB
|n EBL3564102
|
938 |
|
|
|a ebrary
|b EBRY
|n ebr10160717
|
938 |
|
|
|a EBSCOhost
|b EBSC
|n 990974
|
938 |
|
|
|a ProQuest MyiLibrary Digital eBook Collection
|b IDEB
|n 74221
|
938 |
|
|
|a Internet Archive
|b INAR
|n reopeningpublicf0000nati
|
938 |
|
|
|a YBP Library Services
|b YANK
|n 6012083
|
994 |
|
|
|a 92
|b IZTAP
|