Credible threats in negotiations : a game-theoretic approach /

The modern theory of threats in bargaining situations is presented in a unified and systematic treatment that puts the existing literature in a new perspective. Harold Houba and Wilko Bolt provide a masterful synthesis of the fundamental results obtained in the rapidly expanding game-theoretic liter...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Houba, Harold
Otros Autores: Bolt, Wilko
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Boston : Kluwer Academic Publishers, ©2002.
Colección:Theory and decision library. Game theory, mathematical programming, and operations research ; v. 32.
Temas:
Negotiation in business.
Threat (Psychology)
Game theory.
Game Theory
Négociations (Affaires)
Menace (Psychologie)
Théorie des jeux.
SELF-HELP > Personal Growth > Success.
SELF-HELP > Personal Growth > Happiness.
SELF-HELP > Personal Growth > General.
PSYCHOLOGY > Applied Psychology.
Game theory
Negotiation in business
Samfundsvidenskab > Psykologi.
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Cover
  • Table of Contents
  • List of Figures
  • List of Tables
  • Preface
  • Acknowledgments
  • On the authors
  • 1. THE ESSENCE OF NEGOTIATION
  • 1.1. Introduction
  • 1.2. Real life negotiations: motivating examples
  • 1.3. Outline of the book
  • 2. A BARGAINING MODEL WITH THREATS
  • 2.1. Introduction
  • 2.2. The bargaining problem
  • 2.3. A bargaining game with threats
  • 2.4. Related Literature
  • Part I Exogenous disagreement outcomes
  • 3. THE ALTERNATING OFFERS PROCEDURE
  • 3.1. Introduction
  • 3.2. Alternating offers
  • 3.3. Markov perfect equilibrium
  • 3.4. Subgame perfect equilibrium
  • 3.5. Applications
  • 3.6. Related literature
  • 4. THE NASH PROGRAM
  • 4.1. Introduction
  • 4.2. Nash's bargaining solution
  • 4.3. Strategic bargaining and Nash's bargaining solution
  • 4.4. The two approaches are complementary
  • 4.5. Related Literature
  • 5. COMPREHENSIVE BARGAINING PROBLEMS
  • 5.1. Introduction
  • 5.2. Comprehensive bargaining problems
  • 5.3. Markov perfect equilibrium
  • 5.4. Subgame perfect equilibrium
  • 5.5. Nash program
  • 5.6. Contract space
  • 5.7. Related Literature
  • 6. COMPARATIVE STATICS
  • 6.1. Introduction
  • 6.2. Utility functions and the contract space
  • 6.3. Nonstationary bargaining problems
  • 6.4. Alternative bargaining procedure
  • 6.5. Related Literature
  • Part II Endogenous Threats
  • 7. COMMITMENT AND ENDOGENOUS THREATS
  • 7.1. Introduction
  • 7.2. Optimal threats with commitment
  • 7.3. Credible threats without commitment
  • 7.4. Numerical examples
  • 7.5. Related literature
  • 8. BARGAINING OVER WAGES
  • 8.1. Introduction
  • 8.2. A model of wage negotiations
  • 8.3. Wage bargaining with efficient holdouts
  • 8.4. Dutch wage bargaining: an application
  • 8.5. Related literature
  • 9. THE POLICY BARGAINING MODEL
  • 9.1. Introduction
  • 9.2. Subgame perfect equilibria
  • 9.3. Policy Bargaining
  • 9.4. Numerical Examples
  • 9.5. Related literature
  • 10. DESTRUCTIVE THREATS
  • 10.1. Introduction
  • 10.2. Difference games
  • 10.3. Negotiations for quota
  • 10.4. Multiple state variables
  • 10.5. Concluding remarks
  • 10.6. Related literature
  • Appendices
  • Proofs of Selected Theorems
  • References.

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