Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design : Political Insulation in the United States Government Bureaucracy, 1946-1997 /
The administrative state is the nexus of American policy making in the postwar period. The vague and sometimes conflicting policy mandates of Congress, the president, and courts are translated into real public policy in the bureaucracy. As the role of the national government has expanded, the nation...
Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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Autor principal: | |
Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
Idioma: | Inglés |
Publicado: |
Stanford, CA :
Stanford University Press,
[2022]
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Temas: | |
Acceso en línea: | Texto completo Texto completo |
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100 | 1 | |a Lewis, David E., |e author. |4 aut |4 http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut | |
245 | 1 | 0 | |a Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design : |b Political Insulation in the United States Government Bureaucracy, 1946-1997 / |c David E. Lewis. |
264 | 1 | |a Stanford, CA : |b Stanford University Press, |c [2022] | |
264 | 4 | |c ©2003 | |
300 | |a 1 online resource (240 p.) : |b 6 tables, 17 figures | ||
336 | |a text |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
337 | |a computer |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
338 | |a online resource |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
347 | |a text file |b PDF |2 rda | ||
505 | 0 | 0 | |t Frontmatter -- |t Contents -- |t List of Figures and Tables -- |t Acknowledgments -- |t Introduction Agency Design in American Politics -- |t I. Separation of Powers and the Design of Administrative Agencies -- |t 2. Moving from Insulation in Theory to Insulation in Reality -- |t 3. Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design -- |t 4. Testing the Role of Presidents: Presidential Administrative Influence -- |t 5. Testing the Role of Presidents: Presidential Administrative and Legislative Influence -- |t 6. Political Insulation and Policy Durability -- |t Conclusion What the Politics of Agency Design Tells Us About American Politics -- |t Appendix A: Administrative Agency Insulation Data Set -- |t Appendix B: Administrative Agency Insulation Data Set Event File -- |t Appendix C: Agency Data and the Possibility of Sample Selection Bias in Model Estimates -- |t Notes -- |t Bibliography -- |t Index |
506 | 0 | |a restricted access |u http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec |f online access with authorization |2 star | |
520 | |a The administrative state is the nexus of American policy making in the postwar period. The vague and sometimes conflicting policy mandates of Congress, the president, and courts are translated into real public policy in the bureaucracy. As the role of the national government has expanded, the national legislature and executive have increasingly delegated authority to administrative agencies to make fundamental policy decisions. How this administrative state is designed, its coherence, its responsiveness, and its efficacy determine, in Robert Dahl's phrase, "who gets what, when, and how." This study of agency design, thus, has implications for the study of politics in many areas. The structure of bureaucracies can determine the degree to which political actors can change the direction of agency policy. Politicians frequently attempt to lock their policy preferences into place through insulating structures that are mandated by statute or executive decree. This insulation of public bureaucracies such as the National Transportation Safety Board, the Federal Election Commission, and the National Nuclear Security Administration, is essential to understanding both administrative policy outputs and executive-legislative politics in the United States. This book explains why, when, and how political actors create administrative agencies in such a way as to insulate them from political control, particularly presidential control. | ||
538 | |a Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web. | ||
546 | |a In English. | ||
588 | 0 | |a Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 31. Jan 2022) | |
650 | 0 | |a Administrative agencies |z United States. | |
650 | 0 | |a Bureaucracy |z United States. | |
650 | 0 | |a Presidents |z United States. | |
650 | 4 | |a History -- Political. | |
650 | 4 | |a Politics -- United States. | |
650 | 7 | |a POLITICAL SCIENCE / General. |2 bisacsh | |
856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://doi.uam.elogim.com/10.1515/9780804766913 |z Texto completo |
856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://degruyter.uam.elogim.com/isbn/9780804766913 |z Texto completo |
912 | |a GBV-deGruyter-alles |