Individual Strategy and Social Structure : An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions /

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Neoclassical economics as-sumes that people are highly rational and can reason their way through even the most complex economic problems. In Individual Strategy and Social Structure, Peyton Young argues for a more realistic view in which people have a limited understanding of their environment, are...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Young, H. Peyton (Autor)
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, [2020]
Temas:
Evolutionary economics.
Game theory.
Institutional economics.
Social institutions.
BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Economic History.
Blume, Larry.
Gibbs distribution.
Hofbauer, Josef.
Hurkens, Sjaak.
Kandori, Michihiro.
Kreps, David.
Levine, David.
Malouf, Michael.
Nash, John.
Owen, Guillermo.
Schumpeter, Joseph.
alternating offers model.
basin of attraction.
chicken game.
disequilibrium.
ergodic process.
fashion game.
finite improvement path.
interpersonal comparisons.
local conformity.
marriage game.
mode of a distribution.
noise models.
payoffs.
proposal game.
risk factor.
roles in a game.
social capital.
successor state.
vector field.
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