The Arrow Impossibility Theorem /

Kenneth J. Arrow's pathbreaking "impossibility theorem" was a watershed innovation in the history of welfare economics, voting theory, and collective choice, demonstrating that there is no voting rule that satisfies the four desirable axioms of decisiveness, consensus, nondictatorship...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autores principales: Maskin, Eric (Autor, Contribuidor), Sen, Amartya (Autor, Contribuidor)
Otros Autores: Arrow, Kenneth J. (Contribuidor), Arrow, Kenneth, Dasgupta, Partha (Contribuidor), Pattanaik, Prasanta K. (Contribuidor), Pattanaik, Prasanta, Stiglitz, Joseph E. (Contribuidor)
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: New York, NY : Columbia University Press, [2014]
Edición:Pilot project. eBook available to selected US libraries only
Colección:Kenneth J. Arrow Lecture Series
Temas:
Probabilities > Mathematical models.
Probabilities.
Social choice > Mathematical models.
Social choice > Mathematical models.
Social choice.
Voting > Mathematical models.
Voting > Mathematical models.
Voting.
BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Economics / Theory.
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Texto completo

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