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|a 9783642161704
|9 978-3-642-16170-4
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|a 10.1007/978-3-642-16170-4
|2 doi
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|a 003.3
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|a Algorithmic Game Theory
|h [electronic resource] :
|b Third International Symposium, SAGT 2010, Athens, Greece, October 18-20, 2010, Proceedings /
|c edited by Spyros Kontogiannis, Elias Koutsoupias, Paul Spirakis.
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|a 1st ed. 2010.
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|a Berlin, Heidelberg :
|b Springer Berlin Heidelberg :
|b Imprint: Springer,
|c 2010.
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|a VIII, 359 p. 25 illus.
|b online resource.
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|a text
|b txt
|2 rdacontent
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|a computer
|b c
|2 rdamedia
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|a online resource
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|a text file
|b PDF
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|a Information Systems and Applications, incl. Internet/Web, and HCI ;
|v 6386
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|a When the Players Are Not Expectation Maximizers -- How Do You Like Your Equilibrium Selection Problems? Hard, or Very Hard? -- A Simplex-Like Algorithm for Fisher Markets -- Nash Equilibria in Fisher Market -- Partition Equilibrium Always Exists in Resource Selection Games -- Mixing Time and Stationary Expected Social Welfare of Logit Dynamics -- Pareto Efficiency and Approximate Pareto Efficiency in Routing and Load Balancing Games -- On Nash-Equilibria of Approximation-Stable Games -- Improved Lower Bounds on the Price of Stability of Undirected Network Design Games -- On the Rate of Convergence of Fictitious Play -- On Learning Algorithms for Nash Equilibria -- On the Structure of Weakly Acyclic Games -- A Direct Reduction from k-Player to 2-Player Approximate Nash Equilibrium -- Responsive Lotteries -- On the Existence of Optimal Taxes for Network Congestion Games with Heterogeneous Users -- Computing Stable Outcomes in Hedonic Games -- A Perfect Price Discrimination Market Model with Production, and a (Rational) Convex Program for It -- The Computational Complexity of Trembling Hand Perfection and Other Equilibrium Refinements -- Complexity of Safe Strategic Voting -- Bottleneck Congestion Games with Logarithmic Price of Anarchy -- Single-Parameter Combinatorial Auctions with Partially Public Valuations -- On the Efficiency of Markets with Two-Sided Proportional Allocation Mechanisms -- Braess's Paradox for Flows over Time -- The Price of Anarchy in Network Creation Games Is (Mostly) Constant -- Truthful Fair Division -- No Regret Learning in Oligopolies: Cournot vs. Bertrand -- On the Complexity of Pareto-optimal Nash and Strong Equilibria -- 2-Player Nash and Nonsymmetric Bargaining Games: Algorithms and Structural Properties -- On the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Linear Bottleneck Congestion Games -- Minimal Subsidies in Expense Sharing Games.
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|a Computer simulation.
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|a Electronic commerce.
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|a Computer science.
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|a Computers and civilization.
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|a Numerical analysis.
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|a Computer Modelling.
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|a e-Commerce and e-Business.
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|a Theory of Computation.
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|a Models of Computation.
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|a Computers and Society.
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|a Numerical Analysis.
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700 |
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|a Kontogiannis, Spyros.
|e editor.
|4 edt
|4 http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/edt
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700 |
1 |
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|a Koutsoupias, Elias.
|e editor.
|4 edt
|4 http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/edt
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700 |
1 |
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|a Spirakis, Paul.
|e editor.
|4 edt
|4 http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/edt
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710 |
2 |
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|a SpringerLink (Online service)
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773 |
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|t Springer Nature eBook
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776 |
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|i Printed edition:
|z 9783642161698
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776 |
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|i Printed edition:
|z 9783642161711
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830 |
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|a Information Systems and Applications, incl. Internet/Web, and HCI ;
|v 6386
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856 |
4 |
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|u https://doi.uam.elogim.com/10.1007/978-3-642-16170-4
|z Texto Completo
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|a ZDB-2-SCS
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|a ZDB-2-SXCS
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912 |
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|a ZDB-2-LNC
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950 |
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|a Computer Science (SpringerNature-11645)
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950 |
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|a Computer Science (R0) (SpringerNature-43710)
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