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Internet and Network Economics Third International Workshop,WINE 2007, San Diego, CA, USA, December 12-14, 2007, Proceedings /

Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor Corporativo: SpringerLink (Online service)
Otros Autores: Deng, Xiaotie (Editor ), Graham, Fan Chung (Editor )
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg : Imprint: Springer, 2007.
Edición:1st ed. 2007.
Colección:Information Systems and Applications, incl. Internet/Web, and HCI ; 4858
Temas:
Acceso en línea:Texto Completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • WINE 2007
  • Getting to Economic Equilibrium: A Problem and Its History
  • My Favorite Simplicial Complex and Some of Its Applications
  • Markets and the Primal-Dual Paradigm
  • The Computation of Equilibria
  • A Note on Equilibrium Pricing as Convex Optimization
  • New Algorithms for Approximate Nash Equilibria in Bimatrix Games
  • A Unified Approach to Congestion Games and Two-Sided Markets
  • An Optimization Approach for Approximate Nash Equilibria
  • Gradient-Based Algorithms for Finding Nash Equilibria in Extensive Form Games
  • Bluffing and Strategic Reticence in Prediction Markets
  • Pari-Mutuel Markets: Mechanisms and Performance
  • Information Sharing Communities
  • Competitive Safety Strategies in Position Auctions
  • Maintaining Equilibria During Exploration in Sponsored Search Auctions
  • Stochastic Models for Budget Optimization in Search-Based Advertising
  • Auctions with Revenue Guarantees for Sponsored Search
  • Equilibrium Analysis of Dynamic Bidding in Sponsored Search Auctions
  • Cooperative or Vindictive: Bidding Strategies in Sponsored Search Auction
  • Cost-Balancing Tolls for Atomic Network Congestion Games
  • Network Formation: Bilateral Contracting and Myopic Dynamics
  • Who Should Pay for Forwarding Packets?
  • On the Performance of Congestion Games for Optimum Satisfiability Problems
  • Incentive-Compatible Interdomain Routing with Linear Utilities
  • Mechanism Design I
  • False-Name-Proof Mechanisms for Hiring a Team
  • Mechanism Design on Trust Networks
  • Stochastic Mechanism Design
  • A Note on Maximizing the Spread of Influence in Social Networks
  • A Network Creation Game with Nonuniform Interests
  • A Theory of Loss-Leaders: Making Money by Pricing Below Cost
  • PageRank as a Weak Tournament Solution
  • Competitive Influence Maximization in Social Networks
  • Advertisement Pricing I
  • Sponsored Search with Contexts
  • Capacity Constraints and the Inevitability of Mediators in Adword Auctions
  • Cost of Conciseness in Sponsored Search Auctions
  • Adwords Auctions with Decreasing Valuation Bids
  • An Adaptive Sponsored Search Mechanism ?-Gain Truthful in Valuation, Time, and Budget
  • Extending Polynomial Time Computability to Markets with Demand Correspondences
  • Market Equilibrium Using Auctions for a Class of Gross-Substitute Utilities
  • Continuity Properties of Equilibrium Prices and Allocations in Linear Fisher Markets
  • Computing Market Equilibrium: Beyond Weak Gross Substitutes
  • On Competitiveness in Uniform Utility Allocation Markets
  • Total Latency in Singleton Congestion Games
  • The Importance of Network Topology in Local Contribution Games
  • Secure Relative Performance Scheme
  • Selfishness, Collusion and Power of Local Search for the ADMs Minimization Problem
  • The Wi-Fi Roaming Game
  • On the Complexity of Pure Nash Equilibria in Player-Specific Network Congestion Games
  • The Stable Roommates Problem with Globally-Ranked Pairs
  • A PSPACE-complete Sperner Triangle Game
  • Group Dominant Strategies
  • Weighted Boolean Formula Games
  • Core Stability of Vertex Cover Games
  • Mechanism Design II
  • Maximizing Revenue in Sequential Auctions
  • Approximate Mechanisms for the Graphical TSP and Other Graph Traversal Problems
  • To Be or Not to Be (Served)
  • Advertisement Pricing II
  • Ad Auction Design and User Experience
  • Personalized Ad Delivery When Ads Fatigue: An Approximation Algorithm
  • Empirical Price Modeling for Sponsored Search
  • Pay-per-action Model for Online Advertising
  • Public Advertisement Broker Markets
  • Mechanism Design III
  • K-NCC: Stability Against Group Deviations in Non-cooperative Computation
  • Monotone Properties of Randomized Symmetric Incentive Compatible Auctions
  • Computing Optimal Bundles for Sponsored Search
  • On the Price of Truthfulness in Path Auctions
  • Characterizing Truthful Market Design.