Differential Information Economies

One of the main problems in current economic theory is to write contracts which are Pareto optimal, incentive compatible, and also implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a dynamic, noncooperative game. The question arises whether it is possible to provide Walrasian type or cooperative eq...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor Corporativo: SpringerLink (Online service)
Otros Autores: Glycopantis, Dionysius (Editor ), Yannelis, Nicholas C. (Editor )
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg : Imprint: Springer, 2005.
Edición:1st ed. 2005.
Colección:Studies in Economic Theory, 19
Temas:
Econometrics.
Game theory.
Quantitative Economics.
Game Theory.
Acceso en línea:Texto Completo
Descripción
Sumario:One of the main problems in current economic theory is to write contracts which are Pareto optimal, incentive compatible, and also implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a dynamic, noncooperative game. The question arises whether it is possible to provide Walrasian type or cooperative equilibrium concepts which have these properties. This volume contains original contributions on noncooperative and cooperative equilibrium notions in economies with differential information and provides answers to the above questions. Moreover, issues of stability, learning and continuity of alternative equilibria are also examined. .
Descripción Física:XIV, 650 p. online resource.
ISBN:9783540269793
ISSN:2196-9930 ;

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