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Formulating Principal-Agent Service Contracts for a Revenue Generating Unit

This book examines contractual options for a performance based contract between an owner of a revenue generating unit and a repair agent for such unit. The framework of the analysis is that of economists' principal-agent problem. The contractual options of a principal and an agent are modeled a...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autores principales: Zeng, Shuo (Autor), Dror, Moshe (Autor)
Autor Corporativo: SpringerLink (Online service)
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Cham : Springer International Publishing : Imprint: Springer, 2016.
Edición:1st ed. 2016.
Colección:SpringerBriefs in Operations Management,
Temas:
Acceso en línea:Texto Completo

MARC

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300 |a IX, 129 p. 37 illus.  |b online resource. 
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505 0 |a Introduction -- The Basic Principal-Agent -- Risk-Neutral Agent -- Risk-Averse Agent -- Risk-Seeking Agent -- Summary. 
520 |a This book examines contractual options for a performance based contract between an owner of a revenue generating unit and a repair agent for such unit. The framework of the analysis is that of economists' principal-agent problem. The contractual options of a principal and an agent are modeled as a Markov process with an undetermined time horizon. For a risk neutral principal, the authors identify the conditions under which a principal contracts with a risk-neutral, risk-averse, or risk-seeking agent and derive the principal's optimal offer together with the agent's optimal service capacity response. In essence, the book provides an extensive formulating analysis of principal-agent contracts given any exogenous parameter values. Ultimately a small number of formulas cover a large spectrum of principal-agent conditions. 
650 0 |a Operations research. 
650 0 |a Management science. 
650 0 |a Transportation engineering. 
650 0 |a Traffic engineering. 
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650 2 4 |a Operations Research, Management Science . 
650 2 4 |a Transportation Technology and Traffic Engineering. 
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