Formulating Principal-Agent Service Contracts for a Revenue Generating Unit

This book examines contractual options for a performance based contract between an owner of a revenue generating unit and a repair agent for such unit. The framework of the analysis is that of economists' principal-agent problem. The contractual options of a principal and an agent are modeled a...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autores principales: Zeng, Shuo (Autor), Dror, Moshe (Autor)
Autor Corporativo: SpringerLink (Online service)
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Cham : Springer International Publishing : Imprint: Springer, 2016.
Edición:1st ed. 2016.
Colección:SpringerBriefs in Operations Management,
Temas:
Operations research.
Management science.
Transportation engineering.
Traffic engineering.
Operations Research and Decision Theory.
Operations Research, Management Science .
Transportation Technology and Traffic Engineering.
Acceso en línea:Texto Completo
Descripción
Sumario:This book examines contractual options for a performance based contract between an owner of a revenue generating unit and a repair agent for such unit. The framework of the analysis is that of economists' principal-agent problem. The contractual options of a principal and an agent are modeled as a Markov process with an undetermined time horizon. For a risk neutral principal, the authors identify the conditions under which a principal contracts with a risk-neutral, risk-averse, or risk-seeking agent and derive the principal's optimal offer together with the agent's optimal service capacity response. In essence, the book provides an extensive formulating analysis of principal-agent contracts given any exogenous parameter values. Ultimately a small number of formulas cover a large spectrum of principal-agent conditions.
Descripción Física:IX, 129 p. 37 illus. online resource.
ISBN:9783319186726
ISSN:2365-8339

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