Non-Bayesian Decision Theory Beliefs and Desires as Reasons for Action /
This book aims to present an account of rational choice from a non-Bayesian point of view. Rational agents maximize subjective expected utility, but contrary to what is claimed by Bayesians, the author argues that utility and subjective probability should not be defined in terms of preferences over...
Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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Autor principal: | |
Autor Corporativo: | |
Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
Idioma: | Inglés |
Publicado: |
Dordrecht :
Springer Netherlands : Imprint: Springer,
2008.
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Edición: | 1st ed. 2008. |
Colección: | Theory and Decision Library A:, Rational Choice in Practical Philosophy and Philosophy of Science,
44 |
Temas: | |
Acceso en línea: | Texto Completo |