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100407t20112011nyua g 001 0 eng d |
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|a 9780521118590
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|a 9780521134132
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|a DLC
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|a eng
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|a HD2741
|b C8.46
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|a HD2741
|b C8.46
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100 |
1 |
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|a Culpepper, Pepper D.,
|d 1968-,
|e autor
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245 |
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|a Quiet politics and business power :
|b corporate control in Europe and Japan /
|c Pepper D. Culpepper.
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264 |
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1 |
|a Cambridge, U.K. ;
|a New York :
|b Cambridge University Press,
|c [2011].
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264 |
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4 |
|a ©2011.
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300 |
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|a xviii, 221 páginas :
|b ilustraciones, tablas en blanco y negro ;
|c 25 cm.
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336 |
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|a texto
|b txt
|2 rdacontent
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337 |
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|a sin medio
|b n
|2 rdamedia
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338 |
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|a volumen
|b nc
|2 rdacarrier
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490 |
1 |
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|a Cambridge studies in comparative politics.
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500 |
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|a Reimpresión : (2012).
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504 |
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|a Incluye referencias bibliográficas : (páginas 199-213) e índice.
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505 |
0 |
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|g 1.
|t Corporate control and political salience. --
|g 2.
|t Patient capital and markets for corporate control. --
|g 3.
|t Managerial origins of institutional divergence in France and Germany. --
|g 4.
|t Netherlands and the myth of the corporatist coalition. --
|g 5.
|t Managers, bureaucrats, and institutional change in Japan. --
|g 6.
|t Noisy politics of executive pay --
|g 7.
|t Business power and democratic politics.
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520 |
1 |
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|a Does democracy control business, or does business control democracy? This study of how companies are bought and sold in four countries, France, Germany, Japan, and the Netherlands, explores this fundamental question. It does so by examining variation in the rules of corporate control, specifically, whether hostile takeovers are allowed. Takeovers have high political stakes: they result in corporate reorganizations, layoffs, and the unraveling of compromises between workers and managers. But the public rarely pays attention to issues of corporate control. As a result, political parties and legislatures are largely absent from this domain. Instead, organized managers get to make the rules, quietly drawing on their superior lobbying capacity and the deference of legislators. These tools, not campaign donations, are the true founts of managerial political influence.
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650 |
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0 |
|a Corporate governance
|z Europe
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650 |
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4 |
|a Gobierno corporativo
|z Europa
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650 |
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0 |
|a Corporate governance
|z Japan
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650 |
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4 |
|a Gobierno corporativo
|z Japón
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650 |
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0 |
|a Consolidation and merger of corporations
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650 |
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4 |
|a Compañías consolidadas
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830 |
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0 |
|a Cambridge studies in comparative politics
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905 |
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|a LIBROS
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938 |
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|a Comunidad
|c CSH
|
949 |
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|a Biblioteca UAM Iztapalapa
|b Colección General
|c HD2741 C8.46
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